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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 9, 2016, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (HRC) announced that Ireland’s constitutional
prohibition on abortion violated its obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).1 While
the HRC had found in 2005 that Peru violated the ICCPR for not
ensuring a young woman’s access to a legal abortion, the 2016 case
marked the first time the Committee based its view of an ICCPR
violation on a state party’s domestic laws.2 Pro-choice advocates
heralded the decision as a landmark victory that would require
Ireland to legalize abortion in contradiction of its own constitution,3
which “acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws
to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and
vindicate that right.”4 On March 17, 2017, in a case that closely
resembled the 2016 decision, the HRC again declared that Ireland’s
restrictions on abortion violate the country’s obligations under the
ICCPR.5 It was a bold move for the Committee—a body of eighteen
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Mellet v. Ireland, Commc’n No.
2324/2013, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 (2016), https://www.
reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/CCPR-C-116-D2324-2013-English-cln-auv.pdf [hereinafter Mellet v. Ireland].
2
CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, IRELAND MUST LEGALIZE
ABORTION TO END VIOLATIONS OF WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS (2006),
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/G
LP_Europe_MelletvIreland_FS_09%2006_Web.pdf.
3
Id; see also Amelia Gentlemen, UN Calls on Ireland to Reform Abortion Laws
After Landmark Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2016, 1:04 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/09/ireland-abortion-lawsviolated-human-rights-says-un (quoting Colm O’Gorman, Executive Director of
Amnesty International Ireland as saying, “The Irish government must act promptly.
Ireland’s constitution is no excuse. It must be changed to allow the reforms
required by this ruling.”).
4
Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 40.3.3, as amended by the Eighth Am.
(1983).
5
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Whelan v. Ireland, Commc’n No.
2425/2014, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014
(2017),
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/IRL/CCPR_
C_119_D_2425_
1
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experts6 whose recommendations are not binding—to instruct a
sovereign nation to change its domestic law on the basis of an
inferred, rather than explicitly stated, right to abortion.7
The HRC’s recent decisions raise concern for two principal
reasons. First, the treaty monitoring body exceeded its mandate by
asserting Ireland was obligated to fulfill a right that neither the
ICCPR nor any other U.N. human rights treaty recognizes.8 In fact,
the ICCPR and other U.N. human rights treaties are more easily
interpreted to protect the rights of unborn human beings than a
mother’s right to abortion,9 except in situations where the mother
requires life-saving treatment that results in the loss of her child.10
Second, the HRC’s determination that international law requires a
member state to change its domestic laws on abortion arguably
violates the U.N. Charter’s prohibition against intervention in matters
that are exclusively within a state party’s national jurisdiction.11

2014_25970_E.pdf [hereinafter Whelan v. Ireland].
6
Introduction, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
(OHCHR),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx
(last
visited Feb. 19, 2018); Membership, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HR
Bodies/CCPR/Pages/Membership.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
7
Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right International and Regional Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 253 (2008) (stating,
“Committees are not judicial bodies and their Concluding Observations are not
legally binding.”); Michael Perlin, “God Said to Abraham/Kill Me a Son”: Why the
Insanity Defense and the Incompetency Status Are Compatible with and Required by the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Basic Principles of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477, 479 (Perlin, Professor Emeritus of Law at
N.Y.U., states, “[P]olicy pronouncements of U.N. treaty bodies, in the form of
GCs [general comments] or recommendations, are not considered binding
international law.”); see also Michael O′Flaherty, The Concluding Observations of United
Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 27, 36 (2006) (“Arguments
against granting binding status to concluding observations may also be derived
from basic principles of due process of law.”).
8
See infra Parts II (discussing international law’s treatment of abortion) and
III (discussing treaty interpretation and U.N. treaty monitoring body authority).
9
See infra Part IV (discussing the rights of the unborn in international law).
10
See text accompanying infra notes 63-65.
11
See text accompanying infra notes 30-32 and Part III.
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The HRC is not the only U.N. treaty monitoring body that
has sought to compel states parties to change their domestic laws to
comply with an inferred right to abortion. The committees for the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
the Convention Against Torture have also leveled criticism at states
parties for legislation that restricts abortion.12 In addition to treaty
committees, several U.N. agencies and offices have repeatedly
asserted a right to abortion on the basis of explicitly stated human
rights.13 The fact that pro-choice organizations have been directly
involved with the U.N.’s push to pressure states into liberalizing
domestic abortion laws highlights the illegitimacy of these efforts.14
While some states have conformed to the U.N.’s demands, numerous
states have taken a firm stance against encroachments on their
sovereign right to decide domestic law on this controversial matter.15
In the spring of 2018, Ireland will vote in a referendum that will
decide whether the nation will maintain its constitutional abortion

See infra Parts II-III.
This paper focuses primarily on efforts by U.N. treaty monitoring bodies
to infer a human right to abortion from rights explicitly provided for in U.N.
human rights treaties. However, U.N. agencies and offices have also argued in
favor of inferring a right to abortion from established human rights. See, e.g., infra
notes 215, 279-80 and accompanying text (regarding U.N. special rapporteurs); infra
notes 51, 120-26, and accompanying text (discussing the World Health
Organization); infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (regarding the U.N. Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights); infra note 284 and accompanying
text (concerning the U.N. Population Fund); note 287 and accompanying text
(regarding the U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination,
Department of Social and Economic Affairs). Unqualified references to “the U.N.”
refer to U.N. treaty monitoring bodies and the U.N. agencies and offices listed in
parentheses in this footnote.
14
See infra Section III.C.
15
See generally Kelsey Zorzi, The Impact of the United Nations on National
Abortion Laws, 65 CATH. U.L. REV. 409 (2015) (discussing the liberalization of
abortion laws in Nepal, Belgium, Ethiopia, Chad, Columbia, Argentina, Peru, and
potentially Chile); infra Section III.D. (describing state pushback against U.N.
pressure to liberalize domestic abortion laws).
12
13
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restrictions or take a new direction in line with the U.N.’s push for
abortion liberalization.16
A new approach to the issue of abortion in U.N. human
rights treaties is in order. Given the range of state perspectives on
abortion and rights of the unborn, as well as the U.N.’s problematic
interpretations of human rights instruments, perhaps the best way to
proceed is through the adoption of a treaty amendment or protocol
that explicitly addresses these issues.17 Even though differences on
these controversial matters would remain, such an instrument would
clarify the various positions and prevent entities on either side of the
abortion debate from unfairly pressuring states.
Part II of this paper examines the question of whether
international law recognizes a right to abortion, looking primarily at
U.N. human rights treaties and, briefly, customary international law.
Part III looks at principles of treaty interpretation and how U.N.
treaty monitoring bodies have, in conjunction with pro-choice
NGOs, deviated from these principles in their effort to assert a right
to abortion by inference from established human rights and
customary international law. Part IV of this paper then turns to the
issue of whether international law recognizes rights of the unborn.
Part V describes problems that have arisen from the non-legislative
effort to infer a human right to abortion. Part VI then proposes
treaty modification through amendment or, more likely, optional
protocols to clarify states parties’ positions on abortion and rights of
the unborn.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A RIGHT TO
ABORTION
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
to which “all members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties,”18
Ed O’Loughlin, Ireland to Hold Abortion Referendum Next Year, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/europe/irelandabortion-ban-referendum.html?wpmm=1&wpisrc=
nl_daily202.
17
See infra Part VI.
18
U.N. Charter art. 93, ¶ 1.
16
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is considered the authoritative statement on sources of international
law.19 According to Article 38, the primary sources of international
law are international treaties and customary international law.20 No
U.N. human rights treaty speaks of a right to abortion, and, as
discussed in infra Section II.B, neither does customary international
law provide for such a right.21 Even pro-choice NGOs, such as
Amnesty International and Center for Reproductive Rights, have
affirmed that no legally binding global human rights instrument
identifies a right to abortion.22 Accordingly, those who assert an

19
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2003)
(citing U.S. v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 100-103 (2d Cir. 2003) and Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1980)).
20
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(a)-(b), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
21
In a 2011 meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, Mr. Anand Grover,
U.N. Special Rapporteur for Health, expressed that “it was important to recognize
that there was no international law on the matter [of abortion].” Press Release,
Several Aspects of Sexual, Reproductive Health - Providing Information, Using
Contraception, Abortion - Should Be “Decriminalized,” Third Committee Told,
U.N. Press Release GA/SHC/4018 (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.un.org
/press/en/2011/gashc4018.doc.htm.
22
See Zampas & Gher, supra note 7, at 250 (“The African Women′s
Protocol is the only legally binding human rights instrument that explicitly
addresses abortion as a human right and affirms that women′s reproductive rights
are human rights.”); see also PIERO A. TOZZI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
RIGHT TO ABORTION 1 (2010), https://c-fam.org/wp-content/uploads/Intern
ational-Law-and-the-Right-to-Abortion-FINAL.pdf (citing Amnesty International
as saying, “There is no generally accepted right to abortion in international human
rights law.” Amnesty International, ‘Women, Violence and Health,’ Feb. 18,
2005.”). Tozzi notes that in 2007, Amnesty “abandon[ed] neutrality on the abortion
issue.” Id. at n.1. Similarly, in 2003, the Center for Reproductive Rights [hereinafter
CRR] made the following comment, which was entered into the U.S. Congressional
Record: “We have been leaders in bringing arguments for a woman’s right to
choose abortion within the rubric of international human rights. However, there is
no binding hard norm that recognizes women’s right to terminate a pregnancy.”
CENTER FOR FAMILY & HUMAN RIGHTS, WRITTEN CONTRIBUTION OF THE
CENTER FOR FAMILY AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE GENERAL DISCUSSION ON THE
PREPARATION FOR A GENERAL COMMENT ON ARTICLE 6 (RIGHT TO LIFE) OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 9 (June 12, 2015),
http://studylib.net/doc/17701878/written-contribution-of-the-center-for-familyand-human-r. In 2009, the CRR changed its position, though, as with the period of
time between Amnesty’s positions, “Nothing had changed in the intervening years,
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international right to abortion support their position by inference
from rights stipulated in binding international agreements. The longterm goal of this approach appears to be the creation of a customary
international law right to abortion based on states’ positive responses
to pressure from treaty monitoring bodies to relax their domestic
abortion laws.23
A discussion of abortion and rights of the unborn within the
regional human rights systems is beyond the scope of this paper,
which focuses primarily on U.N. human rights treaties and, briefly,
customary international law as global sources of legally binding
human rights norms. However, it bears mentioning that there is one
exception to the otherwise non-existence of a right to abortion in
international law: the African Women’s Protocol (Maputo Protocol),
which was concluded within the African human rights system.24 As of
June 2017, thirty-six out of fifty-four states parties to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights have ratified the Maputo
Protocol, which obligates member states to protect a woman’s right
to abortion “in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the
continued pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of the
mother or the life of the mother or the foetus.”25 In contrast, within
the Inter-American human rights system, the American Convention
recognizes that human life begins at conception.26

either in customary law or in treaty law, to make the [original] statement no longer
true.” Id.
23
See infra Section II.B.
24
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, July 11, 2003, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6,
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/
[hereinafter
Maputo
Protocol],. The Protocol was adopted at a 2003 summit of the African Union in
Maputo, Mozambique. Chi Mgbako & Laura A. Smith, Sex Work and Human Rights
in Africa, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1178, 1202 (2010). As of June 2017, thirty-six out
of fifty-four African nations have ratified the Maputo Protocol. See Ratification Table:
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa, AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS,
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ratification/ (last visited
Feb. 11, 2018).
25
Maputo Protocol, supra note 14, art. 14.2.c.
26
American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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A. Inferring a Right to Abortion Under U.N. Treaties
In her seminal book, Mobilizing for Human Rights, Harvard
Professor Beth Simmons asks why a sovereign nation would bind
itself to an international legal agreement regarding its treatment of its
own nationals.27 She responds that, “[t]he primary reason is that the
government anticipates its ability and willingness to comply.”28 As
Professor Simmons explains, “[g]overnments participate in
negotiations, sign drafts, and expend political capital on ratification in
most cases because they support the treaty goals and generally want
to implement them.”29
The domestic laws of many countries prohibit or strictly limit
a woman’s ability to terminate a pregnancy, and some explicitly
recognize that the right to life begins at conception.30 These states did
not anticipate an obligation to protect a right to abortion when they
signed human rights treaties which make no mention of such a right.
In fact, the legislative history of the relevant U.N. human rights
treaties shows that states parties considered abortion to be a matter
of national jurisdiction.31 Accordingly, U.N. efforts to assert a right to
abortion and hold states accountable for violations of the inferred
right arguably violate Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, which
prohibits the U.N. from intervening in explicitly domestic matters of
any state.32

HURST HANNUM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS
LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 70 (5th ed. 2011) (citing Beth Simmons,
Mobilizing for Human Rights (2009)).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
31
See, e.g., David P. Stewart, Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 161, 178 (1998); Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T.
Lozman, Suffer the Children?: A Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 186 (2006) (stating
that drafters of the Convention on the Rights of the Child sought to ensure the
treaty’s neutrality on the matter of abortion).
32
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
27

OF
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Pro-choice advocates and the U.N., through numerous U.N.
offices and agencies,33 have stated that a woman’s right to abortion is
inferred from treaty-protected rights such as the right to life, the right
to health, the right to be free from torture and from cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to privacy, and the
right to be free from discrimination.34 However, as discussed in infra
Part IV, the relevant U.N. human treaties arguably support
application of these protections to the unborn, or at least, as
indicated in the legislative history, leave the matter up to each state.
Furthermore, while in some cases the U.N. treaty committee findings
are influential, they are non-binding.35 Yet if treaty monitoring bodies
succeed in convincing states that they are legally bound to relax
domestic laws on abortion, non-law could potentially push state
practice into a new norm of customary international law.36
1. Inferring a Right to Abortion from the Right to Life
In 1948 the U.N. General Assembly unanimously voted to
adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).37
Although the UDHR is not binding per se, it provides the foundation
for numerous international human rights treaties.38 In addition, some
See supra note 13.
See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Exporting Subjects: Globalizing Family Law
Progress Through International Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259, 283-84 (2011)
(“[I]t is safe to say that there really is no single international treaty or convention
that is accepted universally and protects women’s right to reproductive choice, let
alone abortion specifically. However, proponents of the recognition of such a right
cobble together the provisions of the UDHR, CEDAW, ICCPR, and ICESCR to
arrive at a rough approximation of legal support for the right.”).
35
See supra note 7.
36
See generally Zorzi, supra note 15 (describing the link between U.N. treaty
monitoring bodies’ pro-abortion rights interpretations and national liberalization of
abortion laws).
37
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; see also
MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS xv (2001).
38
LORI F. DAMROSCH AND SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 936 (6th ed. 2014) (“The Declaration is not a treaty; it was
not adopted as a treaty and was never submitted by states to their respective
ratification processes.”). After the General Assembly adopted the UDHR,
33
34
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parts of the UDHR, such as its prohibitions against state-sanctioned
slavery and torture,39 are regarded as reflective of customary
international law.40 Together, the UDHR, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights41 form the “International Bill
of Human Rights.”42
Article 3 of the UDHR states, “Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and security of person.”43 The right to life is established as
international law through the ICCPR44 and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC).45 A mother’s right to life is the most
compelling argument in support of an inferred right to abortion, as
any other right of the mother (such as the right to health, the right to
privacy, or the right to be free from discrimination) should be
understood as inferior to the unborn child’s competing right to life.46
However, as argued below, there are significant weaknesses in the
link between a mother’s right to life and a right to abortion.

“consensus emerged among states to convert its norms into an international human
rights covenant that would have the binding force of law.” Id. at 937.
39
UDHR, supra note 37, arts. 4-5.
40
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 702(b), (d) (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
42
HANNUM, supra note 27, at 137.
43
UDHR, supra note 37, art. 3.
44
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Dec. 19, 1966, S.
Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
45
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC].
46
See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, art.6, ¶ 1 (16th
session, 1982), http://www.refworld.org/
docid/45388400a.html (“The right to life enunciated in article 6 of the Covenant
. . . is the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation. . . .”).
41
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The Right to Life Under the ICCPR

Under Article 6(1) of the ICCPR, “Every human being has
the inherent right to life.”47Article 6(1) further provides that the right
to life “shall be protected by law [and] [n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.”48 In an effort to draw a link between a right to
abortion and the right to life, pro-choice advocates and U.N. treaty
monitoring bodies, offices, and agencies,49 often cite statistics
regarding maternal death resulting from unsafe abortions.50 For
example, a 2012 World Health Organization publication that refers to
abortion as a human right states that each year, “[a]pproximately
47[,]000 pregnancy-related deaths are due to complications of unsafe
abortion.”51 While this arresting statistic does establish the potential
danger abortion poses to a mother’s life and health, it does not in
itself support a nexus between a mother’s right to life and a right to
abortion. The fact that a practice is dangerous does not justify
categorizing it as a right. Indeed, many acts are proscribed by law
because they are dangerous. Furthermore, given that abortion raises
issues of a prenatal human being’s right to life, those who advocate
for a right to abortion based on a mother’s right to life would do well
to offset the prenatal person’s competing rights by providing
statistics that directly link the risk of carrying a child to term with the
mother’s right to life.52

ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 6(1).
Id.
49
See supra note 13.
50
For example, Christina Zampas and Jaime Gher, both attorneys with the
pro-choice Center for Reproductive Rights when they co-wrote Abortion as a
Right, begin their article by stating, “Every year, at least 70,000 women die from
complications related to unsafe abortions.” Zampas & Gher, supra note 7, at 250.
51
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND
POLICY GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH SYSTEMS 17 (2d ed. 2012),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/70914/1/9789241548434_eng.pdf
[hereinafter Safe Abortion].
52
A 2012 study that was based on data collected between 1998 and 2005
stated that the mortality rate associated with childbirth was higher than the
mortality rate associated with legal abortion. However, as the authors
acknowledged, the study was subject to potentially significant weaknesses, such as
an incomplete assessment of the underlying risks of abortion and childbirth, as well
as possible erroneous analytic rules used in conducting the research. See Elizabeth
47
48
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The experience and testimony of Dr. Anthony Levatino, an
American obstetrician-gynecologist with over twenty years of
experience, highlights the need to more closely examine the asserted
link between abortion and a mother’s right to life.53 Dr. Levatino
performed over 1,200 abortions prior to developing a personal
conviction against the procedure.54 In 2012, he testified before
Congress that the typical high-risk obstetrics case involved a mother
with “severe pre-eclampsia or toxemia.”55 Pre-eclampsia involves a
dangerous spike in blood pressure that can result in a major stroke
and therefore threaten the mother’s life.56 The only cure for preeclampsia is delivery of the baby.57 It is “one of the more common
pregnancy complications, affecting about 5 to 8 percent of all
pregnancies in the United States” and usually occurs in the third
trimester of pregnancy.58 In his Congressional testimony, Dr.
Levatino stated that “[i]n most such cases, any attempt to perform an
abortion ‘to save the mother’s life’ would entail undue and dangerous

G. Raymond and David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced Abortion
and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 215, 215-19
(2012). But see David Reardon, Comment to The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced
Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, PUBMED.GOV (Mar. 5, 2014, 4:17 PM),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/myncbi/david.reardon.1/comments/ (noting the
unreliability of Raymond and Grimes’ “simple comparison of reported mortality
rates” and failure to provide record linkage. Reardon also points out that Raymond
and Grimes neglected to discuss significant research that reached contrary
conclusions regarding the relative safety of childbirth and legal abortion.).
53
Dr. Anthony Levatino, M.D., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
http://health.usnews.com/doctors/anthony-levatino-394395 (last visited July 5,
2017).
54
Bradford Richardson, Video of Former Abortionist Describing Late-Pregnancy
Abortion Goes Viral, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.washington
times.com/news/2016/mar/8/video-former-abortionist-describing-latepregnancy/.
55
Sarah Terzo, Former Abortionist: Abortion Is Never Medically Necessary to Save
the Life of the Mother, LIVE ACTION (Oct. 21, 2016, 10:53 AM),
https://www.liveaction.org/news/former-abortionist-abortion-is-never-medicallynecessary-to-save-the-life-of-the-mother/.
56
Id.
57
Shivani Patel, M.D., Preeclampsia Can Strike Suddenly During Pregnancy, UT
SOUTHWESTERN NEWS (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.utswmedicine.org/stories
/articles/year-2015/preeclampsia.html.
58
Id.
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delay in providing appropriate, truly life-saving care.”59 Accordingly,
in hundreds of pre-eclampsia cases Dr. Levatino saved the mother’s
life by “terminating” her pregnancy by delivering her baby via
Cesarean section.60 Dr. Levatino testified, “In all those cases, the
number of unborn children that I had to deliberately kill was zero.”61
Over one thousand medical doctors, midwives, nurses,
medical professors, and medical students agree with Dr. Levatino,
stating, “As experienced practitioners and researchers in obstetrics
and gynaecology, we affirm that direct abortion – the purposeful
destruction of the unborn child – is not medically necessary to save
the life of a woman.”62 This panel of medical professionals attests to
the “fundamental difference between abortion, and necessary medical
treatments that are carried out to save the life of the mother, even if
such treatment results in the loss of life of her unborn child.”63 An
example of this rare situation is when uterine cancer requires a
hysterectomy to save the mother’s life.64 In such a case, the death of
the child is foreseen, but is not a deliberate act itself; it is an
unfortunate consequence of the mother’s life-saving medical care.65 A
fair discussion of abortion in the context of a mother’s right to life
should incorporate medical considerations such as these.

Terzo, supra note 55.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Daniel Wechter et al., A Second Opinion: Response to 100 Professors, 29
ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 150 (2014).
63
Id.
64
Right to Life, Submission to The Human Rights Committee for the
General Discussion in Preparation for General Comment on Article 6 (Right to
Life) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 7, n.2,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC36Article6Righttolife.aspx,
accessible
under
“Documentation,”
“Written
contributions for the half day of discussion” [hereinafter Right to Life HRC
Submission].
65
Id; see also Wechter et al., supra note 62, at 150 (“[S]eparating the mother
and fetus before fetal viability in life-threatening circumstances is distinct from
elective abortion, since the purpose of the parturition is to hopefully produce both
a living mother and a living fetus, but at least a living mother. There is no intent to
produce a dead fetus.”)
59
60
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Ireland’s Inconsistent Interpretation of the ICCPR

In September 2015, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the
treaty monitoring body that declared in 2016 and 2017 that Ireland’s
abortion laws violated the ICCPR, published Draft General
Comment No. 36, in which it asserted a pro-abortion rights
interpretation of Article 6 (right to life) of the ICCPR.66 The draft
comment states:
Unlike the American Convention on Human Rights,
the Covenant does not explicitly refer to the rights of
unborn children, including to their right to life. In the
absence of subsequent agreements regarding the
inclusion of the rights of the unborn within article 6
and in the absence of uniform State practice which
establishes such subsequent agreements, the
Committee cannot assume that article 6 imposes on
State parties an obligation to recognize the right to
life of unborn children.67
The HRC stated that because the ICCPR does not explicitly
refer to the rights of unborn children, such rights cannot be assumed.
The Committee is selective in their use of this approach to treaty
interpretation; for neither does the ICCPR speak of a “right to
abortion,” and yet the Committee reads such a right into Article 6,
stating:
States parties whose laws generally prohibit voluntary
terminations of pregnancy must, nonetheless, maintain
legal exceptions for therapeutic abortions necessary for
protecting the life of mothers, inter alia by not
exposing them to serious health risks, and for

U.N. Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No. 36:
Article 6 (Right to Life), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/R.36/Rev.2 (Sept. 2, 2015),
available
at
http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/The-Right-to-life.pdf
[hereinafter Draft General Comment No. 36].
67
Id.
66
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situations in which carrying a pregnancy to term
would cause the mother severe mental anguish. . . . 68
The severe mental anguish that a woman suffers in a
pregnancy that comes about through rape or incest cannot be denied.
However, “severe mental anguish” is a subjective term that could be
used to justify abortions in situations in which the domestic laws of a
state party forbid it, such as when the pregnancy does not threaten
the mother’s life. In addition, an honest discussion of the severe
mental harm associated with carrying an unwanted baby to term must
also consider the severe mental harm that mothers often experience
after an abortion.69 For example, two studies from Finland, a nation
with relatively liberal abortion laws, including abortion for socioeconomic reasons,70 found that women who aborted were nearly six
times more likely to commit suicide than those who had given birth.71
While Draft Comment 36 claims that states parties to the
ICCPR “must” provide for abortions, its comments are not
binding.72 Furthermore, the only authority the HRC cites for its
interpretation of the right to life is a list of its own non-binding
concluding observations, all of which advocate for a loosening of
Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis added).
See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
70
WORLD ABORTION POLICIES 2013, U.N., DEPT. OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL AFFAIRS POPULATION DIVISION (2013), http://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/WorldAbortionPolicies20
13/WorldAbortionPolicies2013_WallChart.pdf.
71
Americans United for Life, Letter to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee re: Draft General Comment No. 36 (June 11, 2015),
http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/06-11-2015-UN-letterAUL.pdf [hereinafter AUFL UNHRC Letter] citing Mika Gissler et al., Suicides
After Pregnancy in Finland, 1987-94, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1431, 1432 (1996); Mika
Gissler, et al., Injury Deaths, Suicides and Homicides Associated with Pregnancy,
Finland 1987-2000, 15 EUROPEAN J. PUB. HEALTH 459, 460 (2005)). AUFL’s letter
lists hundreds of studies regarding the harm that abortion causes the mother’s
health, including harm to her mental health that culminates in suicide.
72
See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1840 (citing Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 351 (1997)
(discussing the “expressly nonbinding nature of Committee’s decisions”)).
68
69
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states parties’ domestic restrictions on abortion, and a non-binding
World Health Organization publication that likewise unilaterally
classifies abortion as a right.73
c.

The Right to Life Under the CRC

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), like the
ICCPR, explicitly acknowledges the right to life. Under Article 6 of
the CRC, “States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent
right to life . . . [and] shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the
survival and development of the child.”74 The Convention defines
“child” as “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”75
Like the HRC, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the
treaty monitoring body for the CRC, has issued concluding
observations that infer a mother’s right to abortion, in this case an
adolescent mother, from her right to life.76 For example, in March
2016 the Committee on the Rights of the Child published its
Concluding Observations on the Combined Third and Fourth
Periodic Reports of Ireland, in which the Committee called upon the
country to “[d]ecriminalize abortion in all circumstances and review its
legislation with a view to ensuring access by children to safe abortion and
post-abortion care services. . . .”77 The CRC Committee is but one of

See Draft General Comment No. 36, nn.11-18, 20.
CRC, supra note 45, art. 6.
75
Id., art. 1.
76
Pro-choice advocates have likewise asserted a right to abortion via
Article 6 of the CRC. See, e.g., Zampas & Gher, supra note 7, at 259-60 (advocating
for a “right to abortion” for adolescent mothers under the CRC and noting
concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child).
77
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the
Combined Third and Fourth Period Reports of Ireland, CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4, 1
Mar. 2016, ¶ 58(a), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybody external
/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4&Lang=En [hereinafter CRC
2016 Concluding Observations on Ireland] (emphasis added).
73
74
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five U.N. treaty monitoring bodies that has pressured Ireland to
change its constitutional law regarding abortion.78
The inference of a mother’s right to abortion is in direct
conflict with strong textual arguments against a right to abortion
under the CRC and in favor of the CRC’s protection of the unborn
person’s right to life. First, neither the text nor the travaux
préparatoires (“travaux”) of the CRC refer to a right to abortion.79
According to human rights scholars, and contrary to the views of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the drafters of the CRC
intentionally did not take a position on abortion, recognizing that the
states parties’ domestic legislation on the matter would vary.80 As
Professor David Stewart stated, “[a] credible effort was made during
the drafting process to ensure that the Convention is ‘abortion
neutral.’“81 Second, in spite of indications of abortion neutrality in the
travaux, the preamble explicitly indicates that the Convention’s
protections extend to the unborn, stating, “the child, by reason of his
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care,
including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.”82

Fiona De Londras, Fatal Foetal Abnormality, Irish Constitutional Law, and
Mellet v Ireland, 24 MED L. REV. 591 (2016) (referencing concluding observations
and comments by the HRC; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
CEDAW Committee; Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Committee
Against Torture).
79
Thomas Finegan, Article: International Human Rights Law and the “Unborn”:
Texts and Travaux Preparatories, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 121 (2016)
(“Furthermore, neither the text nor the travaux gives any indication that the
UNCRC contains a right to abortion.).
80
See Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 31, at 186 (“The CRC does not take a
position on family planning or abortion issues. Most observers assume that the
CRC’s authors deliberately left the CRC’s provisions on family planning open to
interpretation by each of the ratifying States Parties.”).
81
Stewart, supra note 31, at 178.
82
CRC, supra note 45, pmbl; see infra Section IV.A.1.c regarding the right to
life for the unborn under the CRC; see also Abby F. Janoff, Note: Rights of the Pregnant
Child Vs. Rights of the Unborn Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 22 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 163, 165 (2004) (stating that “[t]he Convention’s textual ambiguity calls
into question the legality of abortion under the Convention. . . .”). The author
nonetheless argues that, based on the non-binding views of the Committee and
decisions of regional human rights bodies, which are not binding on non-parties to
78
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2. Inferring a Right to Abortion from the Right to Health
U.N. treaty committees and various U.N. agencies and offices
have also sought to infer a right to abortion from the right to health,
which states parties to five U.N. human rights treaties have agreed to
ensure their citizens.83 In support of the inference of a right to
abortion from the mother’s right to health, pro-choice advocates and
the U.N. often refer to the Programme of Action that was adopted at
the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development
(ICPD) in Cairo.84 The Programme of Action is not binding; even if
it were, it does not provide convincing support for inferring a right to
abortion from the right to health.85 On the contrary, it contains
strong language against abortion:

the regional human rights treaties, “under the Convention, the rights of a pregnant
child trump the rights of a fetus.” Id. at 164, 176. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties does consider “subsequent practice” to be a valid consideration for
treaty interpretation. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. However, the “subsequent
practice” to which the VCLT refers is not the subsequent practice of U.N. treaty
committees or regional human rights judiciaries, but rather that of the states parties
to the particular U.N. treaties at issue. The VCLT states that, in interpreting
treaties, “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context . . . any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation.” Id.
83
The right to health is recognized under the CRC, ICESCR, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Disabilities
Convention), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. See Stephen P. Marks, Normative Expansion of the Right to Health and
the Proliferation of Human Rights, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 97, n.14 (2016).
84
Zampas & Gher, supra note 7, at 268 (citing Report of the International
Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 5-13 Sept. 1994,
A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 (1995), Chapter VIII C. Women′s Health and Safe
Motherhood, ¶ 8.25).
85
See Ligia M. De Jesus, Treaty Interpretation of the Right to Life Before Birth by
Latin American and Caribbean States: An Analysis of Common International Treaty
Obligations and Relevant State Practice at International Fora, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
599, 619-20 (2012) (“Contrary to common misconceptions, CEDAW . . . and other
international, non-binding instruments, such as the Cairo and Beijing international
conferences, do not create abortion rights.”).
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In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family
planning.
All
Governments
and
relevant
intergovernmental
and
non-governmental
organizations are urged to strengthen their
commitment to women’s health, to deal with the
health impact of unsafe abortion as a major public
health concern and to reduce the recourse to abortion
through expanded and improved family-planning
services. Prevention of unwanted pregnancies must always
be given the highest priority and every attempt should be
made to eliminate the need for abortion. Women who have
unwanted pregnancies should have ready access to
reliable information and compassionate counselling. Any
measures or changes related to abortion within the
health system can only be determined at the national or local
level according to the national legislative process. In
circumstances where abortion is not against the law,
such abortion should be safe. In all cases, women
should have access to quality services for the
management of complications arising from abortion.
Post-abortion counselling, education and familyplanning services should be offered promptly, which
will also help to avoid repeat abortions.86
As Harvard professor Mary Ann Glendon said, “One would
hardly say of an important right like free speech, for example, that
governments should reduce it, eliminate the need for it, and help
avoid its repetition.”87 Not only did the Cairo conference delegates
Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 513
Sept.
1994,
A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1
(1995),
244
¶
63(i),
http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/programme_of_action_Web
%20ENGLISH.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter Cairo Conference]. It should be
noted that the statement “Prevention of unwanted pregnancies must always be
given the highest priority and every attempt should be made to eliminate the need
for abortion” refers to contraception, meaning the prevention of pregnancy
through conception, as opposed to the termination of a conceived human being
through abortion.
87
Mary Ann Glendon, What Happened at Beijing, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 1996),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/1996/01/005-what-happened-at-beijing
[hereinafter Glendon, What Happened at Beijing]; see also De Jesus, supra note 85, at
86
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not agree to a right to abortion, some countries explicitly stated their
opposition to such a right in reservations they added to the
conference outcome document.88
In 2015, the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) launched the Information Series on Sexual
and Reproductive Health and Rights, in which the Office sought to
infer a right to abortion from the right to health.89 The section on
abortion states, “Ensuring access to [abortion] in accordance with
human rights standards is part of State obligations to . . . ensure
women’s right to health as well as other fundamental human
rights.”90 In support of this proposition, the OHCHR references
non-binding treaty committee communications and the Cairo ICPD
Programme of Action, in spite of its clear language against abortion.91
Like the OHCHR, the Committee on the Rights of the Child
has asserted a right to abortion through the right to health. Under
620 (“Even though the outcome documents for the international conferences of
Cairo and Beijing, . . . (the nature of which is entirely non-binding), are often cited
as authorities supporting the creation of international abortion rights, neither
document comes close to doing so”).
88
See William L. Saunders, Neither by Treaty, Nor by Custom: Through the Doha
Declaration, the World Rejects Claimed International Rights to Abortion and Same-Sex
Marriage, Affirming Traditional Understandings of Human Rights, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 67, 88-89 (2011).
89
OHCHR, LAUNCH OF THE INFORMATION SERIES ON SEXUAL AND
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS (2015), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/SexualHealth/Flyer%20Launch%20Event%2
0 Information%20Series%20SRHR%20final.pdf (emphasis added).
90
OHCHR, INFORMATION SERIES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH AND RIGHTS: ABORTION, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues
/Women/WRGS/SexualHealth/INFO_Abortion_
WEB.pdf.
91
Id. The OHCHR also cited the non-binding Beijing Platform for Action,
which was adopted at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, stating “in
circumstances where abortion is not against the law, health systems should train
and equip health-service providers and should take other measures to ensure that
such abortion is safe and accessible. Additional measures should be taken to
safeguard women’s health.” Id. at 1. As with the Cairo Programme of Action, this
statement does not establish a right to abortion as inferred by a woman’s right to
health. On the contrary, it indicates that abortion is illegal in some nations and may
threaten a woman’s health.
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Article 24 of the CRC, “States Parties recognize the right of the child
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to
facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health [and]
. . . shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right
of access to such health care services.”92 However, as discussed in
infra Section IV.A.1.c, interpreting Article 24 to include a right to
abortion conflicts with the CRC preamble’s explicit reference to the
vulnerability of unborn children in describing the rationale for the
CRC’s protections.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child did not mention
the CRC’s reference to protection for unborn children in its 2016
concluding observations on Ireland, in which it criticized Ireland’s
domestic abortion law which allows for abortion only when
pregnancy poses a “real and substantial risk” to the mother’s life.93 In
spite of Ireland’s sovereign decision to balance the rights of the
unborn child against the rights of the mother, the Committee
recommended that Ireland “[d]ecriminalize abortion in all
circumstances and review its legislation with a view to ensuring access by
children to safe abortion. . . .”94 By stating that Ireland’s CRC obligations
required that the government “ensure access” to abortions, the
Committee effectively read a right to abortion into the CRC’s right to
health. In order to fulfill this right, Ireland would need to ensure
sufficient abortion providers and facilities—measures that Ireland,
whose Constitution explicitly protects unborn life, certainly did not
anticipate when it ratified the CRC.95 Moreover, requiring medical
practitioners to provide abortion services could violate their explicit
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion under Article
18 of the ICCPR, to which Ireland is a party, as well as freedom of
opinion and expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR.

CRC, supra note 45, art. 24(1).
CRC 2016 Concluding Observations on Ireland, supra note 77, ¶ 57.
94
Id. ¶ 58(a) (emphasis added).
95
See infra text corresponding to notes 101-10 (quoting the treaty
monitoring bodies for the CEDAW and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural rights as requiring states to subordinate the conscientious
objection of medical providers to those seeking to exercise an inferred right to
abortion).
92
93
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In addition to the OHCHR and the Committee on the Rights
of the Child, the treaty monitoring body for the U.N. Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW),96 has also asserted a right to abortion from the right to
health. Article 12 of CEDAW states:
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in the field of
health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality
of men and women, access to health care services,
including those related to family planning.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of
this article, States Parties shall ensure to women
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy,
confinement and the post-natal period, granting free
services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition
during pregnancy and lactation.97
Although Article 12 of the CEDAW contains no reference to
abortion, and the travaux of CEDAW demonstrate that the drafters
did not consider “family planning” or other CEDAW terminology to
create a right to abortion, “[t]he CEDAW Committee regularly
appeals to Article 12(1) of CEDAW to support abortion rights.”98 In
fact, among the U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, the CEDAW
Committee “is perhaps the most insistent on a human right to
abortion,”99 having criticized over one hundred states parties’
domestic restrictions on abortion on the basis of non-binding U.N.
publications.100 For example, in 2014 the CEDAW Committee, in
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, art. 11.1(f), Dec. 21, 1965, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; 19
I.L.M. 33 [hereinafter CEDAW].
97
Id. art. 12(1), (2).
98
Finegan, supra note 79, at 124-25.
99
Id. at 124; see also Joanne Pedone & Andrew R. Kloster, New Proposals for
Human Rights Treaty Body Reform, 22 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 29, 50-52 (20122013) (“The clearest example of [the CEDAW Committee’s] overstepping can be
seen in the context of abortion.”).
100
See Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 52 (stating that the CEDAW
Committee has “criticized well over eighty nations for having restrictions on
abortion, based on the authority of its very own General Recommendation
96
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connection with a woman’s right to health, recommended that Peru
“[e]nsure the availability of abortion services” and “[e]nsure that the
exercise of conscientious objection by health professionals does not
impede effective access by women to reproductive health-care
services, including abortion.”101 Considering that the ICCPR, to which
Peru is a party,102 explicitly guarantees the right to freedom of
conscience, and neither the text of the CEDAW nor its travaux
provide for a right to abortion, the CEDAW Committee’s
interpretation raises significant concerns that the Committee has
overstepped its treaty mandate.103
In line with pro-abortion rights efforts by the OHCHR, the
CRC Committee, and the CEDAW Committee, the Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which oversees state
party compliance with the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), published in 2016 General
Comment No. 22, which sought to interpret the ICESCR’s right to
sexual and reproductive health to include a right to abortion.104 Like
the CEDAW Committee, the CESCR even went so far as to assert
that states parties were required to ensure that the “[u]navailability of
goods and services due to ideologically based policies or practices,
such as the refusal to provide services based on conscience, . . . not
be a barrier to accessing [abortion] services.”105 The CESCR would
specifically require states to supply “[a]n adequate number of healthNumber 24.”). A more recent publication accounts for subsequent instances of the
Committee’s admonishments. See De Jesus, supra note 85, at 623.
101
CEDAW, Concluding observations on the combined seventh and
eighth periodic reps. of Peru, P 36(d), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PER/CO/7-8 (July
24, 2014) ¶¶ 36(b), (d), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal
/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW/C/PER/CO/7-8&Lang=En
(emphasis
added).
102
See Status of Ratification, Peru, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
103
See infra Section III.B; see also Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 49-54.
104
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
General Comment No. 22 on the Right to Sexual and Reproductive health (Art. 12
of the ICESCR), P 28, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/22 (Mar. 4, 2016),
https://www.escr-net.org/resources/general-comment-no-22-2016-right-sexualand-reproductive-health [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No. 22].
105
Id. ¶ 14.
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care providers willing and able to provide [abortion] . . . in both
public and private facilities.”106 In addition to public and private
healthcare practitioners and facilities, the Committee also stated that
the inferred right to abortion required states to prohibit conscientious
objections of private health insurance companies.107 According to the
CESCR, state parties’ duty to fulfill the “right to abortion” would
also require the “adopt[ion] [of] appropriate legislative,
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other
measures. . . .”108 Perhaps most troubling of all is the Committee’s
suggestion that states must “take affirmative measures to eradicate
social barriers in terms of norms or beliefs that inhibit individuals of
different ages and genders, women, girls and adolescents from
autonomously exercising their right to sexual and reproductive
health,”109 which the Committee interprets to include a right to
abortion.110 If the CESCR’s standard were to be strictly enforced,
religious organizations, and even individuals, would presumably be
prohibited from communicating their belief that abortion is the
termination of a human being, in spite of treaty-affirmed rights to
freedom of opinion and expression.
To support its pro-abortion rights interpretation of the right
to sexual and reproductive health, the CESCR does not cite a treaty,
or even a U.N. consensus document, but rather a resolution adopted
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe—hardly a
fair representation of the global views regarding abortion, and
certainly not binding on many ICESCR states.111 Moreover, the

Id.
Id. ¶ 60.
108
Id. ¶ 45.
109
Id. ¶ 48
110
Id. ¶¶ 28, 34 (“A wide range of laws, policies and practices undermine
the autonomy and right to equality and non-discrimination in the full enjoyment of
the right to sexual and reproductive health, for example criminalization of abortion
or restrictive abortion laws.”) (emphasis added).
111
Id. at n.21.
106
107
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CESCR is not authorized to judge state party compliance on the basis
of anything but the ICESCR’s requirements.112
The CEDAW Committee has likewise cited non-binding
European standards in support of its effort to create a right to
abortion. For example, in 2000 the Committee criticized
Luxembourg’s abortion laws, which the Committee considered
“anachronistic.” 113 The CEDAW Committee further stated “that the
Government appear[ed] to lack the commitment to review and adapt
this legislation to changing attitudes and developments in the
European region.”114 At the time, Luxembourg allowed for abortion
when a physician determined the procedure was necessary to
preserve a woman’s life or health, as well as in cases where the
pregnancy was the result of rape or incest.115 Luxembourg also
permitted abortion on the basis of fetal impairment, and even social
or economic considerations.116 Evidently the CEDAW Committee
was not satisfied, as Luxembourg’s domestic laws did not allow
abortion on demand.117
Nowhere in the CEDAW treaty mandate is the Committee
authorized to pressure a state to accommodate the “changing
attitudes and developments” within a region, particularly on the basis
of a right that does not expressly appear in international law.
Furthermore, the Committee’s censure arguably violated the U.N.
Charter’s prohibition against intervention in matters exclusively
within national jurisdiction, such as abortion.118 Nonetheless, in 2012
Luxembourg changed its laws on abortion at least in part because of
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99 at 42 (quoting a former HRC member
as stating that this practice “rais[es], at a minimum, issues of mandate and
competency”).
113
Rep. of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women: Concluding Comments by the Committee: Germany, U.N. Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 22nd Sess., P 318, U.N. Doc.
A/55/38 (2000) ¶ 406, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports
/a5538.pdf.
114
Id.
115
Zorzi, supra note 15, at 409.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
112
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the pressure from the CEDAW Committee to conform to European
norms.119
Like the OHCHR, the World Health Organization (WHO), a
specialized U.N. agency,120 has contributed to the U.N. treaty
monitoring bodies’ “[c]onsiderable normative expansion . . . [of]
reproductive health and rights.”121 In 2012, the WHO published the
second edition of Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health
Systems.122 The publication asserts that “[t]he fulfilment of human
rights requires that women can access safe abortion when it is
indicated to protect their health.”123 In support of this proposition,
the WHO cites an extensive list of non-binding treaty committee
general comments and concluding observations, as well as the
Maputo Protocol, which applies only to the specific African nations
that have ratified that treaty.124
In spite of the absence of a right to abortion in international
law, the WHO, like the CESCR and the CEDAW Committee, goes
so far as to suggest that the inferred right trumps explicitly
guaranteed rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion,
and even requires states to force unwilling healthcare providers to
perform abortions, stating:
While the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion is protected by international human
rights law, international human rights law also
stipulates that freedom to manifest one’s religion or
beliefs might be subject to limitations necessary to
protect the fundamental human rights of others.
Zorzi, supra note 15, at 410.
Funds, Programmes, Specialized Agencies and Others, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/funds-programmes-specializedagencies-and-others/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
121
Marks, supra note 83, at 110.
122
See generally Safe Abortion, supra note 51.
123
Id. at 92; see also id. at 64 (“Abortion laws and services should protect
the health and human rights of all women, including adolescents. . . . Emergency
treatment of abortion complications . . . cannot replace the protection of women’s
health and their human rights afforded by safe, legal induced abortion.”).
124
Id. at 99, n.9.
119
120
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Therefore laws and regulations should not entitle
providers and institutions to impede women’s access
to lawful health services. Health-care professionals
who claim conscientious objection must refer the
woman to another willing and trained provider in the
same, or another easily accessible health-care facility,
in accordance with national law. Where referral is not
possible, the health-care professional who objects must provide
abortion to save the woman’s life or to prevent damage to her
health.125
Exactly how a state might force an objecting healthcare
professional to provide an abortion is unclear.126 The WHO provides
no practical suggestions.
Despite efforts by NGOs and U.N. treaty monitoring bodies,
agencies, and offices to establish a right to abortion through the right
to health, in 2011 Thoraya Obaid, upon completing ten years as
executive director of the U.N. Population Fund, stated, “We,
UNFPA, are mandated to consider abortion within the context of
public health, but never as a right, as some NGOs do. . . . Abortion is
a national issue to be decided by national laws and legislations.”127
She could have added “and U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, agencies,
and offices” after “NGOs.”
3. Inferring a Right to Abortion from Other Rights
In addition to the right to life and the right to health, U.N.
treaty committees have sought to infer a right to abortion from the
right to be free from torture and from cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, the right to privacy, the right to equality before the law,
Id. at 96 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The WHO’s troubling suggestion is not entirely unprecedented. In 2015
Sweden attempted to force a Christian midwife to perform abortions. See Swedish
Anti-Abortion Midwife Loses Court Case, BBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39587154.
127
Katherine Marshall, Navigating the Turbulent Waters of Religion and Women’s
Rights: An Interview with Thoraya Obaid, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2011),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/katherine-marshall/courageous-in-navigating_b_806313.html.
125
126
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and the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil
and political rights.128
a.

The Right to Freedom from Torture and CIDTP

The ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture (CAT)
obligate states parties to protect their citizens from torture and
“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (CIDTP).129
While neither the ICCPR nor the CAT mention abortion, the HRC
and the Committee Against Torture, the treaty monitoring body for
the CAT, have asserted that numerous states parties have violated
their obligation to prevent CIDTP because of domestic restrictions
against abortion.130 The HRC’s 2016 decision in Mellet v. Ireland131 and
See, e.g., Views of the Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 1608/2007,
L.M.R. v. Argentina, P 8.5, 9.4, 10 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007 (Apr.
28, 2011) (finding that Argentina had violated Article 2 of the ICCPR (failure to
provide judicial remedy) in connection with Article 3 of the ICCPR (the “equal
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights”) on
account of the fact that only women could potentially have abortions and therefore
Argentina’s prohibition against the procedure amounted to discriminatory
treatment against the author of the communication). The WHO would expand
upon this list of human rights bases for an inferred right to abortion, stating that, in
addition to the aforementioned rights, states that do not “provide comprehensive
sexual and reproductive health information and services to women and adolescents,
eliminate regulatory and administrative barriers that impede women’s access to safe abortion
services and provide treatment for abortion complications . . . may not meet their
treaty and constitutional obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the right to . . .
confidentiality, information and education.” Safe Abortion, supra note 51, at 88
(emphasis added).
129
ICCRP, supra note 44, art. 7; Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. 2(1), 16(1) Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
130
See Alyson Zureick, (En)Gendering Suffering: Denial of Abortion as a Form of
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 99, 100-101, 125-131
(2015), stating: International law has long considered the regulation of abortion to
be a prerogative of the State. In recent years, however, international human rights
bodies have begun to consider the conformity of domestic abortion regulations
with States’ human rights obligations [and examining a] trend among human rights
bodies: namely, their willingness to find that denying or obstructing a woman’s
access to abortion can amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (“CIDT”)
under multiple human rights treaties. Id. at 100.
131
Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 7.4.
128
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its 2017 nearly identical decision in Whelan v. Ireland132 provide recent
examples of this practice.
Mellet v. Ireland involved a woman who desired to have an
abortion when she discovered, in her twenty-first week of pregnancy,
that her baby had a congenital heart defect that would result in the
baby’s death “in utero or shortly after birth.”133 Given that Ireland’s
laws did not permit abortion in Ms. Mellet’s situation, she traveled to
England to terminate her baby’s life.134 Citing only its own nonbinding general comment, the HRC found that because Ireland
permits abortion only when necessary to save the mother’s life, “the
State party had subjected Ms. Mellet to conditions of intense physical
and mental suffering.”135 The bases for the HRC’s finding were
essentially the facts that Ms. Mellet had to travel to England to obtain
the abortion; that she experienced “shame and stigma associated with
the criminalization of abortion of a fatally ill foetus;” and that she had
to cover her own expenses for the trip and procedure.136 In spite of
Ireland’s explicit legal protection of unborn life, the HRC did not
discuss how Ms. Mellet’s twenty-three-week-old fetus, who had a
heartbeat and was capable of experiencing pain, may have suffered
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on account of the
feticide’s impact on the unborn baby’s body.137

Whelan v. Ireland, supra note 5, ¶ 7.7.
Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 2.1.
134
Id. ¶ 2.2.
135
Id. ¶ 7.4.
136
Id.
137
Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 2.3. According to “[a] wealth of
anatomical, behavioral and physiological evidence . . . the developing human fetus
is capable of experiencing tremendous pain by 20 weeks post-fertilization.”
Doctors on Fetal Pain, http://www.doctorsonfetalpain.com/fetal-pain-theevidence/ [hereinafter Doctors on Fetal Pain]. As medical doctors have explained,
[p]ain receptors are present throughout the unborn child’s entire body by no later
than 16 weeks after fertilization, and nerves link these receptors to the brain’s
thalamus and subcortical plate by no later than 20 weeks. For unborn children, says
Dr. Paul Ranalli, a neurologist at the University of Toronto, 20 weeks is a “uniquely
vulnerable time, since the pain system is fully established, yet the higher level painmodifying system has barely begun to develop.” As a result, unborn babies at this
age probably feel pain more intensely than adults. Id. Furthermore, [b]y 8 weeks
after fertilization, the unborn child reacts to touch. By 20 weeks post-fertilization,
132
133
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The Right to Privacy

In Mellet v. Ireland, the HRC also found that Ireland had
violated its obligation to not arbitrarily interfere with Ms. Mellet’s
right to privacy.138 Article 17 of the ICCPR states, “No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation [and] [e]veryone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”139 The
HRC “consider[ed] that the balance that Ireland has chosen to strike
between protection of the foetus and the rights of the woman in this
case [could not] be justified,” and by not providing Ms. Mellet with
an abortion in Ireland, the state party caused an unreasonable and
arbitrary violation of her Article 17 right to privacy.140 As with its proabortion interpretation of the right to freedom from CIDTP, the
HRC cited only its own non-binding publications to support its
finding that “a woman’s decision to request termination of
pregnancy” is inferred by her right to privacy.141
c.

The Right to Equality Before the Law (Non-Discrimination)

Article 26’s prohibition against discrimination was the third
basis upon which the HRC determined that Ireland had violated its
ICCPR obligations in not providing Ms. Mellet with an abortion.
Article 26 states:

the unborn child reacts to stimuli that would be recognized as painful if applied to
an adult human—for example, by recoiling. Surgeons entering the womb to
perform corrective procedures on unborn children have seen those babies flinch,
jerk and recoil from sharp objects and incisions. In addition, ultrasound technology
shows that unborn babies at 20 weeks and earlier react physically to outside stimuli
such as sound, light and touch. Id. See also infra notes 258-63 and accompanying
text.
138
Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 7.8.
139
ICCRP, supra note 44, art. 17.
140
Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 7.8.
141
Id. ¶ 7.7. The HRC came to the same conclusion in Whelan v. Ireland.
See Whelan v. Ireland, supra note 5, ¶ 7.9 (citing the HRC’s non-binding decision in
Mellet v. Ireland).
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All persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of
the law . . . the law shall prohibit any discrimination
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.142
With respect to discrimination based on gender, the HRC
“note[d] the author’s claim that Ireland’s criminalization of abortion
subjected her to a gender-based stereotype of the reproductive role of
women primarily as mothers, and that stereotyping her as a
reproductive instrument subjected her to discrimination.”143 The
Committee did not further elaborate on, or provide its own analysis
of, the connection between a right to abortion and gender
discrimination. Certainly, carrying a child to term impacts the mother
in ways that the father cannot experience physically, mentally, or
socially. However, as the HRC itself stated, discrimination involves a
“differentiation of treatment.” 144 In denying Ms. Mellet an abortion,
Ireland did not treat Ms. Mellet differently than it treats male citizens
by, for example, depriving her of a state job or medical coverage
because of her pregnancy. Ireland does not permit the termination of
human life in utero under any circumstances other than when the
mother’s life is determined to be in jeopardy. Ireland is not
responsible for the fact that only women are biologically capable of
carrying a child, and it certainly did not discriminate against Ms.
Mellet on the basis of her gender in denying her an abortion.
The HRC also found that Ireland’s denial of an abortion in
Ms. Mellet’s case constituted discrimination on the basis of socioeconomic circumstances. Specifically, Ireland’s public health system
would have covered Ms. Mellet’s medical expenses if she had carried
ICCRP, supra note 44, art. 26.
Id.
144
Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 7.11 (“[N]ot every differentiation of
treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate
under the Covenant.”).
142
143
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her baby to term, but she had to pay out of pocket for the costs of
traveling to and having an abortion in England.145 However, Ireland
does not provide abortions to any person under Ms. Mellet’s
circumstances. The fact that Ms. Mellet had to cover her own
expenses to procure in another country a procedure that was illegal
under her own nation’s laws did not establish differentiation of
treatment. Accordingly, as with its gender discrimination analysis, the
Committee did not satisfy its own “differentiation of treatment”
criteria with respect to discrimination on the basis of socio-economic
status. As HRC member Anja Seibert-Fohr stated in her partial
dissent in the Mellet matter, as well as in the nearly identical 2017
Whelan matter, “Difference in treatment requires comparable
situations in order to give rise to discrimination.”146
B. Customary International Law Does Not Establish a Right to
Abortion
In addition to treaties, “international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law,” forms the second of the two
primary sources of international law.147 The Restatement provides the
classic definition of customary international law (CIL), stating,
“Customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”148 As discussed below, the “general and consistent
practice of states” does not affirm abortion as a human right.149

145
146

Id. ¶ 7.10.
Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 4; Whelan v. Ireland, supra note 5, at

22, ¶ 4.
ICJ Statute, supra note 20, art. 38(1)(b).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §102(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
149
See Saunders, supra note 88, at 81 (“despite the frequent representations
of pro-abortion . . . advocates [regarding a right to abortion], international law-customary or otherwise--does not actually support their claims or objectives”); see
also De Jesus, supra note 85, at 618 (“[N]o international norm of customary
international law recognizes a human right to take the life of an unborn child
through abortion or mandates the legalization of abortion.”).
147
148

102

2018

Pushing a Right to Abortion through the Backdoor

6:1

When states ratify human rights treaties, they agree to give
the rights contained therein effect in their national legislation. For
example, Article 2 of the ICCPR provides:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative
or other measures, each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes and with
the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such
laws or other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.150
If states considered themselves bound by treaties or
customary international law to provide access to abortion, their
domestic laws would reflect that belief, and their courts would hold
accountable those who restrict others from obtaining an abortion. A
global survey of domestic legislation on abortion, however, reflects
an inconsistency that unravels any claim to a right to abortion as a
matter of CIL,151 other than a possible regional custom in Africa.152
States’ laws range from absolute prohibitions against abortion under
any circumstances to allowing abortion on demand (simply because
the mother does not want the baby) up to a certain point of the
pregnancy.153 In fact, as discussed in infra Section V.B, because of the

ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 2(2).
Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Abortion, Moral Law, and the First Amendment:
The Conflict Between Fetal Rights & Freedom of Religion, 23 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN
& L. 271, 306 (2017) (“The parameters for allowable abortion vary drastically from
country to country.”); see also Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 50 (“International
consensus on the topic has proven impossible because countries hold widely
divergent views. Consequently, the negotiation of many international human rights
treaties that could address abortion, even tangentially, has resulted in an agreement
to reserve the issue for states to resolve individually.”); Eliza Mackintosh, Abortion
Laws Around the World: From Bans to Personal Choice, CNN (Jan. 25, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/health/abortion-laws-around-the-world/
(“Abortion laws vary dramatically around the world -- in some countries it’s a
personal choice, in others it’s flatly illegal, and in many countries abortions are only
accepted in certain situations such as fetal impairment or in cases of rape.”).
152
See supra note 24 (discussing the Maputo Protocol).
153
Billauer, supra note 151, at 306-07.
150
151
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lack of international consensus on abortion, “[i]n April 2015, for the
first time in history, the United Nations Commission on Population
and Development concluded without an outcome document.”154
Aware of the fact that CIL does not presently recognize a
right to abortion, it appears that U.N. treaty monitoring bodies,
offices, and agencies anticipate that if they can assert a right to
abortion with sufficient force and frequency, enough nations will
change their domestic laws to comply with the asserted right, thereby
proving sufficient state practice with opinio juris to constitute a new
rule of customary international law: a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Similarly, the U.N. might expect that by pressuring enough states to
liberalize their abortion laws they can establish abortion-friendly
“subsequent practice” by which to reinterpret human rights treaties
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and
therefore build a strong case against resistant nations.155
III. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE SURREPTITIOUS EFFORT TO
CRAFT A RIGHT TO ABORTION
In partnership with pro-choice NGOs, U.N. treaty
monitoring bodies, offices, and agencies have sought to push a right
to abortion through international law’s back door with right-byinference treaty interpretations that could, if enough states respond
by changing their domestic abortion laws, lead to a new rule of
customary international law. However, as Professor Mary Ann
Glendon has said, “it is a basic principle of interpretation that
fundamental rights cannot be created or destroyed by implication.”156
A. Treaty Interpretation
The VCLT157 is considered “far and away the most legally
authoritative guide to the accurate interpretation of . . . international

154

Johanna Kalb, Human Rights Proxy Wars, 13 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 53, 76

(2017).
155
156
157

See VCLT, supra note 82, art. 31(3)(b).
Glendon, What Happened at Beijing, supra note 87.
VCLT, supra note 82.

104

2018

Pushing a Right to Abortion through the Backdoor

6:1

legal treaties.”158 As of June 2017, 114 states have ratified the
VCLT.159 Under Article 31 of the VCLT, states parties agree that
treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”160 Article 31
further provides that treaty terms can have special meanings, if it is
determined that such was the intention of the parties.161 Where the
meaning of a treaty term remains uncertain, clarification may be
sought from the travaux préparatoires.162
The term “abortion” does not appear in any U.N. human
rights treaty, and states have agreed that abortion is not included
within the term “family planning.”163 As such, one would expect
treaty monitoring bodies to justify their interpretations in accordance
with accepted treaty interpretation methodology. However, “the
manifold ‘concluding observations’ concerning abortion simply assert
that the Articles in question contain a right to abortion,”164 despite
the fact that the travaux to several of the treaties reveal that the states
parties specifically agreed to leave the matter of abortion up to each
state.165

Finegan, supra note 79, at 91.
Status of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTIONS, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ View DetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg_no=XXIII-1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited Feb.
23, 2018).
160
VCLT, supra note 82, art. 31(1). Article 31 of the VCLT is considered a
reflection of customary international law. Finegan, supra note 79, at n.11.
161
VCLT, supra note 82, art. 31(4).
162
Id. art. 32.
163
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 44; s ee also id. at 51, stating,
Article 12 [of the CEDAW] contains the phrase “family planning,” and two [U.N.]
conferences in 1994 and 1995 expressly confirmed that states did not understand
“family planning” to include abortion rights. Nonetheless, just four years later in
1999, the CEDAW Committee issued General Recommendation 24, asserting
“family planning” includes a right to abortion. It cited to no authority for this
proposition.
164
Finegan, supra note 79, at 122.
165
See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text regarding the CRC
travaux. See Finegan, supra note 79, at n.151 regarding CEDAW travaux.
158
159
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B. The Limits of Treaty Monitoring Body Authority
The core U.N. human rights treaties provide for the creation
of a body of between ten and twenty-three independent experts
charged with monitoring state party compliance.166 The treaty
monitoring body mandates authorize these experts to:
1. Monitor the periodic reports of States Parties;
2. Honor States Parties’ requests to send a delegation
during the consideration of their State Party’s periodic
report;
3. Issue summaries of States Parties’ compliance in
treaty body annual reports; and
4. Issue collective, non-binding, and non-critical
comments, suggestions, and recommendations on
States Parties’ periodic reports.167
Treaty monitoring bodies have not, however, been given
authority to issue “freestanding legal interpretations divorced from
the consideration of States Parties’ [periodic] reports.”168 In addition,
as Michael O’Flaherty observed while serving on the HRC, some of
the Committees’ concluding observations “bear little relationship to
the list of issues” that the treaty bodies submit to states parties prior
to reviewing the states’ periodic reports.169 Furthermore, although the
treaty mandates limit the monitoring bodies’ comments to the states
parties’ compliance with the relevant treaty, more recent comments
“incorporate other treaties, conventions, and statements extraneous
to the treaty, and their opinions often go far beyond the text of the
treaty.”170

166
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 31; Human Rights Bodies, OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/ Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx (last
visited Feb. 23, 2018).
167
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 34 (internal citations omitted).
168
Id. at 44.
169
O’Flaherty, supra note 7.
170
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 43, 45, 49; see also O′Flaherty, supra
note 7 (“The non-binding nature of concluding observations is all the more evident
when account is taken of the extent to which treaty bodies make recommendations
on matters extraneous to the actual treaty obligations of the States Parties. . . .”).
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In agreeing to the treaty provisions that created the
monitoring bodies and determined the extent of their authority,
nations envisioned treaty bodies that would engage in an objective
evaluation of state compliance in connection with the states’ periodic
reports.171 Instead, the treaty committees have exceeded the limits of
their authority by reinterpreting treaty obligations and, in spite of the
non-binding nature of their Comments and Concluding
Observations, “authoritatively instruct[ing] . . . State Part[ies] to make
detailed changes to . . . domestic laws and [even their] international
obligations.”172 These activities arguably violate Article 2(7) of the
U.N. Charter, which prohibits the U.N. from interfering in matters
that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the states
parties.173
The CEDAW Committee, in particular, has far exceeded its
mandate, aggressively policing states on the domestic matter of
abortion, on the basis of questionable treaty interpretations.174
O’Flaherty has criticized the CEDAW Committee for, like the HRC,
citing external sources and raising issues extraneous to the CEDAW.
He states that this practice “rais[es], at a minimum, issues of mandate
and competency.”175 Former CEDAW Committee member, Dr.
Krisztina Morvai, has also criticized the CEDAW Committee’s
overstepping, “not[ing] that poorer countries ‘are regularly challenged
about their human rights obligations and are often dependent on aid,’

Michael O’Flaherty was a member of the Human Rights Committee when he wrote
The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies.
171
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at n.14 (citing the 1989 U.N. Secretary
General as stating, in an official U.N. document, “In order to maintain a
constructive emphasis on the nature of the work of the Committees and in order to
facilitate a consensus-based approach, the treaty bodies have [correctly, in my view]
sought to avoid any inference that they are passing judgment on the performance
of a given State party on the basis of an examination of its report.”).
172
Id. at 40, 42-43. For example, in 2010, the Committee Against Torture
instructed Liechtenstein to renegotiate a 1982 treaty it had concluded with Austria.
Id. at 42.
173
See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7.
174
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 50.
175
Id. at 42.
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which leaves them ‘particularly vulnerable’ to treaty body pressure to
change their cultural norms.”176
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has also stepped
beyond its mandate in an effort to interpret the CRC to require states
to provide access to abortion.177 Although the CRC Committee’s
mandate provides for “general recommendations” with respect to
state party periodic reports, in 2001 the Committee began issuing
thematic “general comments” disconnected from state submissions
that, for example, “urg[e] states ‘to develop and implement
programmes that provide access to sexual and reproductive health
services, including . . . safe abortion services where abortion is not
against the law. . . .’“178 In addition, the CRC Committee has invited
NGOs to “days of thematic discussion” that yield “adopted
recommendations.”179 This is precisely what the HRC did in 2015 in
preparation for its Draft General Comment 36, which sought to
redefine Article 6 (right to life) of the ICCPR to explicitly permit
abortion and exclude unborn children from the Article’s
protection.180
Like the CEDAW Committee and the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, the HRC has gone beyond the limits of its treatybased authority and “act[ed] ultra vires [in] seek[ing] to alter, add to,
or diminish the rights recognized by the ICCPR.”181 Numerous
Id. at n.79.
De Jesus, supra note 85, at 634-35.
178
See, e.g., id. at n.44 (citing Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General
Comment No. 4 (2003)).
179
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 173.
[T]he CRC has certainly overstepped its mandate with its own organization and
execution of “days of thematic discussion.” While it is permitted to request the
General Assembly to recommend to the U.N. Secretary General that the Secretariat
conduct “studies on specific issues relating to the rights of the child,” the CRC
itself has held days of thematic discussion on eighteen occasions. In further
contravention of its mandate, the CRC has “adopted recommendations” following
the conclusion of each annual conference. Id.
180
See supra Section II.A.1.a.i.
181
Finegan, supra note 79, at 124 (“It is not clear whether the HRC
believes that its abortion observations are incontrovertible, self-evident, and in
need of no justification whatsoever, or whether it believes that it has the power to
develop human rights law beyond . . . what is provided for in the ICCPR.”).
176
177
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scholars, including some who support the HRC’s practices,
acknowledge that the Committee has acted outside its mandate.182
The treaty monitoring bodies have not engaged in these
mandate excesses in isolation. As discussed below, “NGOs have
been using treaty bodies as the backdoor to furthering their interests
when domestic political efforts have met insurmountable
resistance.”183 Cooperation with outside interests to transform treaty
obligations surely was not what states anticipated when they agreed
to monitoring bodies that would be comprised of impartial and
independent experts of “high moral character and recognized
competence in the field of human rights.”184 Even Michael
O’Flaherty, while a member of the HRC, wrote that the accuracy and
functionality of treaty body concluding observations was
compromised, at least in part, by “the lack of independence or
expertise of significant numbers of treaty body members.”185
C. The Concerted Effort to Create a Right to Abortion
In 1984, international human rights scholar Philip Alston
prophetically wrote:
As the perceived usefulness of attaching the label
“human right” to a given goal or value increases, it
can be expected that a determined effort will be made
by a wide range of special interest groups to locate
their cause under the banner of human rights. Thus,
in the course of the next few years, UN organs will be
under considerable pressure to proclaim new human
rights without first having given adequate

182
See id. at n.147; see also Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 41 (“[E]ven
experts like Alston admit, giving treaty bodies the power to pressure States Parties
to take a certain course of action fundamentally changes their role.”).
183
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 76.
184
ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 28(2); see also CRC, supra note 45, art. 43(2);
CEDAW, supra note 96, art. 17(1).
185
O’Flaherty, supra note 7.
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consideration to their desirability, viability, scope or
form.186
Alston’s prediction has come to pass. By 1994, a movement
was underway to create a right to abortion through non-legislative
means. Reporting on her experience at the 1994 U.N. Conference on
Population and Development in Cairo, Mary Ann Glendon stated
that, “an abortion rights initiative led by a hard-edged U.S. delegation
pushed all other population and development issues into the
background.”187 The following year at the U.N. Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing, Professor Glendon observed:
A minority coalition, led by the powerful fifteenmember European Union negotiating as a bloc, was
pushing a version of the sexual and abortion rights
agenda that had been rejected by the Cairo
conference. The EU-led coalition was so intent on its
unfinished Cairo agenda that it was stalling
negotiations on other issues. Equally disturbing, the
coalition was taking positions with ominous
implications for universal human rights.188
Notwithstanding these efforts, “the Beijing conference had
no authority to add to or tinker with the corpus of universal human
rights.”189

Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality
Control, 78 A.J.I.L. 607, 614 (1984) [hereinafter Alston, Conjuring Up New Human
Rights]. Alston has held numerous high-level positions at the U.N. See Mr. Philip
Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org /EN/Issues/Poverty/Pages/PhilipAlston.aspx (last visited
Feb. 23, 2018).
187
Glendon, What Happened at Beijing, supra note 87.
188
Id.
189
Id. (“The UN historically has conducted that process with great care
and gravity, most recently at the 1993 Human Rights Conference in Vienna. It
would indeed be a dark day if human rights could be revised in disorderly
negotiating sessions such as those where the Beijing health sections were rammed
through.”).
186
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In 1996, a year after the Beijing conference, the lobbying
relationship that Alston had foreseen between NGOs and treaty
monitoring bodies played out in a conference in Glen Cove, New
York.190 The gathering was organized and run by pro-choice
lobbyists, such as the Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR). The
lobbyists invited representatives from the Committee on the Rights
of the Child, the HRC, the CEDAW Committee, the Committee
against Torture, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, and the Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, as well as other U.N. representatives, all of whom
attended in their official capacity.191 Financial support for the meeting
was provided by the U.N. Population Fund (UNPF), the U.N.
Division for the Advancement of Women, and the OHCHR, which
oversees the treaty monitoring bodies192 and has promoted an
international right to abortion.193
The report that emerged from the meeting “outlin[ed] a
strategy to force an international right to abortion.”194 For example,
the report instructed the CEDAW Committee to “apply the right to
non-discrimination on the ground of gender, in relation to the
criminalization of medical procedures which are only needed by
women, such as abortion.”195 At the meeting, members of the HRC
also laid out a process for using various provisions of the ICCPR,
including Article 6 (right to life) and Article 12 (the right to privacy),
to support a right to abortion.196 The CEDAW Committee followed
this strategy in General Comment 24, and the HRC Committee
applied the strategy in Mellet v. Ireland, Whelan v. Ireland, and Draft

190
See Saunders, supra note 88, at n.101; see also Pedone & Kloster, supra
note 99, at 54.
191
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 54, n.111.
192
Id. at 54, n.110.
193
See text accompanying supra notes 89-91.
194
Saunders, supra note 88, at n.101.
195
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 55 (citing Round Table of Human
Rights Treaty Bodies on Human Rights Approaches to Women’s Health, with a
Focus on Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights).
196
Id. at n.115.
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Comment 36, among numerous other comments, recommendations,
and concluding observations.197
This intertwining of NGO and U.N. interests goes even
deeper: many of the U.N. officials in attendance at the Glen Cove
meeting also held board positions at the time with one or more of the
NGOs that were advocating for a right to abortion at the Glen Cove
meeting.198 For example, while serving on the board of directors for
the CRR, Nafis Sadik was also the executive director of the UNPF.199
In addition, “at the time of the meeting half the members of the
[CEDAW Committee] were simultaneously serving on the boards of
one or more of the NGOs seeking to change the operation of the
treaty bodies.”200
The NGO-U.N. joint effort to establish a right to abortion
was further exposed in 2003 when a series of internal CRR memos
detailing a plan to create a right to abortion was leaked to the U.S.
Congress.201 The memos boldly stated, “There is a stealth quality to
the work . . . We are achieving incremental recognition of values
without a huge amount of scrutiny from the opposition.”202 The CRR
accurately described the effectiveness of their stealth efforts. In fact,
See supra Section II.A.
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 55, n.115.
199
Id. at 55, n.117.
200
Id. at 55.
201
Kalb, supra note 154, at 68.
202
Id.; see also Saunders, supra note 88, at 79-80, providing an excerpt from
the CRR’s “Summary of Strategic Planning,” which states:
The [International Legal Program]’s overarching goal is to ensure that governments
worldwide guarantee reproductive rights out of an understanding that they are
legally bound to do so. . . . Supplementing . . . treaty-based standards and often
contributing to the development of future hard norms are a variety of “soft
norms.” These norms result from interpretations of human rights treaty
committees, rulings of international tribunals, resolutions of intergovernmental
political bodies, agreed conclusions in international conferences[,] and reports of
special rapporteurs. (Sources of soft norms include: the European Court of Human
Rights, the CEDAW Committee, provisions from the Platform for Action of the
Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women, and reports from the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Health). A member of the United States Congress
entered this document into the Congressional Record in 2003. Saunders, supra note
88, at nn.50-51 (citing 149 CONG. REC. E2534, E2535 (2003)).
197
198
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it was the CRR who in 2005, together with two Latin American prochoice NGOs, represented the young woman in K.L. v. Peru, in which
the HRC proclaimed that Peru’s refusal to provide an abortion in a
non-life-threatening pregnancy violated the woman’s rights to
privacy, freedom from torture or CIDTP, and special care for
minors.203 The CRR also filed the petitions for Amanda Mellet and
Siobhán Whelan, in which the HRC determined, in 2016 and 2017,
respectively, that Ireland’s domestic abortion laws violated rights to
privacy, non-discrimination, and freedom from torture or CIDTP.204
The CRR is not the only pro-choice lobbying group that has sought
to push a right to abortion into international law through the U.N.
treaty monitoring system. For example, the International Women’s
Health Coalition has stated:
The international conference and human rights
documents . . . do not explicitly assert a woman’s
right to abortion, nor do they legally require safe
abortion services as an element of reproductive health
care. Moreover, the ICPD [UN International
Conference on Population and Development, 1994]
and FWCW [Fourth World Conference on Women,
1995] agreements recognize the wide diversity of
national laws and the sovereignty of governments in

203
Human Rights Comm., Commc’n. No. 1153/2003, K.L. v. Peru, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003, ¶ 6.6 (Oct. 24, 2005), accessible at
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symboln
o=CCPR%2fC%2f85%2fD%2f1153%2f2003&Lang=en.
204
Press Release, Center for Reproductive Rights, U.N. Committee Finds
Ireland’s Abortion Laws Are Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading (June 9, 2016),
https://www.reproductiverights.org/press-room/un-committee-finds-irelandsabortion-laws-are-cruel-inhumane-and-degrading (“In November 2013, the Center
for Reproductive Rights filed a complaint on behalf of Amanda Mellet before the
United Nations Human Rights Committee, arguing that Ireland’s restrictive
abortion laws violated her basic human rights by subjecting her to severe mental
suffering and anguish.”); Press Release, Center for Reproductive Rights, U.N.
Committee: Criminalization of Abortion in Ireland Violates Woman’s Human
Rights, New Decision Marks Second Time the U.N. Human Rights Committee
Calls for Abortion Law Reform in Ireland (June 13, 2017),
https://www.reproductiverights.org/press-room/un-committee-criminalization-ofabortion-in-ireland-violates-womans-human-rights-0.
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determining national laws and policies. Despite these
qualifications, however, the conference documents
and human rights instruments—if broadly interpreted and
skillfully argued—can be very useful tools in efforts to
expand access to safe abortion.205
What pro-choice advocates and members of the U.N. treaty
monitoring bodies seem to be seeking is not a woman’s ability to
procure a safe abortion in connection with life-saving treatment for
the mother, but an altogether unrestricted right to terminate the life
of her child, at any point in the pregnancy and for any reason.206 For
example, attorneys for CRR wrote:
[S]ignificant progress has recently been made within
international and regional human rights discourses
requesting States Parties to liberalise abortion laws
and actualise women′s right to safe abortion services.
The recognition by treaty-monitoring bodies that
restrictive abortion laws may force women to seek
illegal, and hence, unsafe abortions which threaten
their lives, can be used by advocates to support
abortion on request or for socio-economic reasons.207
Likewise, with respect to the 2016 case of Mellet v. Ireland,
Professor Fiona De Londras argues that the HRC’s decision “not
only further reinforces the need for constitutional change in Ireland
in situations of fatal foetal abnormality, but in all situations where
abortion is sought.”208
In promoting an unrestricted right to abortion by extension
from explicit treaty-guaranteed human rights, U.N. treaty committees

Saunders, supra note 88, at 80.
See, e.g., De Londras, supra note 78 (arguing for an expansion of CIDT to
include every denial of abortion).
207
Zampas & Gher, supra note 7 (emphasis added). Zampas and Gher go
on to say, “If . . . the [Maputo] Protocol is not interpreted to recognise socioeconomic grounds for abortion, then the asserted socio-economic basis can and
should be subsumed under physical or mental health grounds.” Id.
208
De Londras, supra note, 78 (emphasis added).
205
206
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have told sovereign nations they “must provide women with the
means to abort their unborn children in public medical facilities . . .
generally whenever the unborn child is undesired.”209 As mentioned above, in
2016 the Committee on the Rights of the Child urged Ireland to
“[d]ecriminalize abortion in all circumstances and review its legislation
with a view to ensuring access by children to safe abortion and post-abortion
care services. . . .”210 It is ironic that the effort to establish a right to
abortion is finding its basis in the very treaties that were born out of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims: “the
inherent dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world. . . .,”211 and yet the most vulnerable members of the
human family—the unborn—are almost never mentioned in
Committee communications.
Treaty monitoring bodies fulfill a vital purpose when they
remain within their mandate as “non-adversarial facilitator[s] [that]
help States Parties examine their human rights records . . . [and]
engage States Parties in a constructive dialogue on human rights
issues pertinent to the treaty.”212 It is an altogether different scenario,
however, when treaty monitoring bodies exceed their mandate and
work in concert with special interest NGOs to create a human right
that states never agreed to fulfill, and then repeatedly and openly
criticize states for not measuring up to that expectation. At that
point, the monitoring body loses credibility. While their pressure
De Jesus, supra note 85, at 622-23 (emphasis added).
CRC 2016 Concluding Observations on Ireland, supra note 77, ¶ 58(a)
(emphasis added).
211
UDHR, supra note 37, pmb. ¶ 1 (emphasis added). The U.N. has even
asserted itself into the African regional human rights system. In 2016, a group of
U.N. experts, together with the African Commission on Human and People’s
Rights, “urged the President of Sierra Leone . . . to sign the 2015 Safe Abortion Bill
. . . without further delay.” The Bill “is aimed at ensuring women’s and adolescents’
access to safe services regarding abortion and authorizes the termination of a
pregnancy under any circumstances up to 12 weeks. . . .” Press Release, U.N. and
African Experts Urge Sierra Leone’s President to Save Millions of Women’s Lives
by Signing the 2015 Safe Abortion Bill, (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?
NewsID=16994&LangID=E.
212
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 74.
209
210
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tactics may be effective in cases of vulnerable nations dependent on
international aid, once more resistant states parties start speaking up
about treaty body overstepping, other nations may gain courage to
resist as well. It is not surprising that some are calling for treaty body
reform and denunciation of efforts to read a right to abortion into
U.N. human rights treaties.213
D. State Pushback
States have begun to push back against the effort to create a
right to abortion out of established human rights. For example, at the
2017 U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, the United States
clearly stated its position that the right to abortion does not exist in
international law and, while the United States “is the largest donor of
bilateral reproductive health and family planning assistance,” such
assistance will not include abortion services.214 Likewise, in spite of
pressure U.N. Special Rapporteurs have aimed at Honduras to
liberalize its national abortion laws, in 2017 the Honduran Parliament
voted against such changes in legislation, seventy-seven to five, with
eight abstentions.215 Pakistan and Cameroon have both stated that
See id. at 77-82 (suggesting treaty amendment, state denouncement of
treaty monitoring body overstepping, ethics rules for treaty monitoring body
membership, and adherence to treaty body mandates). See also De Jesus, supra note
85, at 634-35 (“Ultra vires interpretations in favor of creating abortion rights in
Latin America and the Caribbean through the CRC . . . should be denounced by
states parties as illegitimate and irrelevant for the purposes of binding treaty
interpretation.”). But see Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 30, n.2, (noting calls
for greater enforcement by treaty bodies).
214
Explanation of Position on Agreed Conclusions at the 2017 UN Commission on
the Status of Women, UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS (Mar. 24,
2017), https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7724.
215
Honduras Needs Progressive Reform of Abortion Law to Advance Women’s
Human Rights, Say UN Experts, OHCHR(Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21549 &LangID=E;
Honduras Votes in Favour of Life Despite Outside Pressure, ADF INT’L (May 10, 2017),
https://adfinternational.org/detailspages/press-release-details/honduras-votes-infavour-of-life-despite-outside-pressure; see also Ligia M. De Jesus, Treaty Interpretation
of the Right to Life Before Birth by Latin American and Caribbean States: An Analysis of
Common International Treaty Obligations and Relevant State Practice at International Fora, 26
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 599, 626 (“Latin American states have persistently opposed
unilateral attempts to read abortion rights or obligations to legalize abortion into
213
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pressure by the CEDAW Committee to change domestic abortion
laws conflicts with their national consensus that a fetus is a child,
children are a vital part of society, and abortion is murder.216
Ireland has also asserted its sovereign prerogative to
determine domestic law on abortion. In 2013, in response to the
complaint filed with the U.N. Human Rights Committee in the
matter of Mellet v. Ireland, Ireland asserted that its “constitutional and
legislative framework reflects the nuanced and proportionate
approach to the considered views of the Irish Electorate on the
profound moral question of the extent to which the right to life of
the foetus should be protected and balanced against the rights of the
woman.”217 Nonetheless, Ireland paid Ms. Mellet an ex gratia sum of
€30,000 (approximately $35,000 USD).218 Whether Ireland will offer
payment to Siobhán Whelan, the complainant in the factually similar
2017 HRC decision against Ireland, and other Irish women who have
traveled out of the country for an abortion, remains to be seen.219
More significant is the question of whether Ireland will vote in 2018
to overturn its constitutional protection for unborn life, as the HRC
claims the nation is obligated to do in order to comply with the
Committee’s interpretation of the ICCPR.220
IV. RIGHTS OF THE UNBORN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Pro-choice advocates and U.N. treaty monitoring bodies,
offices, and agencies typically look at the abortion issue solely in the
context of the mother’s rights. They neglect to consider that the U.N.
human rights treaties ensuring the rights to life, to health, to be free
from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to
international treaties and non-binding international conference outcome
documents. . . .”).
216
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at n.79.
217
Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 4.2.
218
Aidan Lonergan, Ireland’s €30,000 Compensation to Woman Who Travelled to
Britain for Abortion Could Now See Others Seek Reparations, THE IRISH POST (Dec. 2,
2016),
http://irishpost.co.uk/irelands-e30000-compensation-woman-travelledbritain-abortion-now-see-others-seek-reparations/.
219
See Whelan v. Ireland, supra note 5.
220
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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be free from discrimination—rights from which they seek to infer a
right to abortion—arguably guarantee those same rights to the
unborn. John Keown, professor at Georgetown University’s
Kennedy Institute of Ethics, states that in researcher Rita Joseph’s
book, Human Rights and the Unborn Child,
Joseph argues cogently and clearly that an unborn
child’s right to life is far more plausibly grounded in
[international human rights treaties] than is a right to
abortion . . . [;]however, . . . the unborn child’s rights
have “been obscured for some decades now by the
rise of a new pro-abortion ideology in the form of
radical feminism,” which has conducted “a masterly
campaign of ideological reinterpretation.”221
Indeed, many parties to the relevant U.N. human rights
treaties had domestic laws protecting unborn life at the time of
ratification and did not intend that their treaty obligations would
abrogate those laws.222
An examination of the regional human rights systems’
treatment of abortion and the unborn is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, it is worth noting that though the Maputo Protocol
in Africa, discussed above, recognizes a woman’s right to abortion
under specific circumstances, the Inter-American human rights
system’s American Convention on Human Rights protects an unborn
person’s right to life from the moment of conception.223 The
American Convention states, “Every person has the right to have his
life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general,
from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life.”224 As of June 2017, twenty-three of thirty-five

221
John Keown, International Law and the Unborn Child, NATIONAL REVIEW
(Sept. 24, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos
/247662/international-human-rights-law-and-unborn-child-john-keown.
222
Finegan, supra note 79, at 100.
223
See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
224
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 4(1), Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
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Organization of American States parties have ratified the American
Convention.225
A. Rights of the Unborn in U.N. Treaties
As discussed in supra Part II of this paper, neither global
human rights treaties nor customary international law recognize a
right to abortion. Where U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, offices, and
agencies assert such a right as inferred from any right but the
mother’s competing right to life, such an assertion pits the most
essential human right—the right to life—against inferior rights, such
as health, privacy, and freedom from discrimination.226 U.N. treaty
monitoring bodies, offices, and agencies often avoid this conflict by
not discussing the unborn at all, in spite of treaty language that
supports the inclusion of the unborn as human beings entitled to
dignity and human rights. On the rare occasion that a U.N.
publication does mention the competing rights of the unborn, it
unilaterally denies such rights without a sound explanation.227
1. The Right to Life
a.

Under the UDHR

The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states that “all members of the human family” have inherent dignity,
and therefore “equal and inalienable rights.”228 Given that science

Venezuela’s denunciation of the American Convention became
effective in September 2013. Organization of American States, Press Release,
IACHR Deeply Concerned over Result of Venezuela’s Denunciation of the
American Convention, (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media
_center/PReleases/2013/064.asp.
226
As the OHCHR has stated, the right to life “is the supreme right from
which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation.” Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, art.6, ¶ 1
(16th session, 1982), http://www.refworld.org/docid/45388400a.html.
227
See, e.g., infra Section IV.A.1.b (discussing the HRC’s unsatisfying
answer to why the ICCPR should be interpreted to allow for the right to abortion
even though the Convention prohibits application of the death penalty with respect
to pregnant women).
228
UDHR, supra note 37, pmbl.
225
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establishes that the unborn are “human beings” from the moment of
conception,229 the UDHR arguably supports their inclusion in the
Declaration’s protections. In addition, Article 3 states, “Everyone has
the right to life, liberty and security of person.”230 This broad wording
“enshrines the right to life in a manner that has left it vulnerable to
interpretation by abortion opponents who argue that a fetus is
included in ‘everyone’ and, therefore, abortion would be a violation
of the Declaration.”231
On the other hand, pro-choice advocates have argued that
Article 1’s statement that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights” precludes an interpretation of the UDHR that
includes the unborn.232 They consider the drafters’ rejection of a
proposal to remove the term “born” as evidence of an intentional
exclusion of the unborn from the UDHR’s protections.233 However,
“as Johannes Morsink shows in his study into the origins of the
UDHR, debates over the retention or rejection of the term ‘born’ did
not center on the question of abortion or the moral status of fetal
life, but on whether human rights are inherent to human nature or,
instead, are attributed to human beings from some source extrinsic to
their very existence, such as society or law.”234 In fact, the travaux
record that René Cassin, one of proposers of the term, as well as
See When Human Life Begins, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PEDIATRICIANS
(Mar. 2017), https://www.acpeds.org/the-college-speaks/position-statements/lifeissues/when-human-life-begins, explaining that:
The predominance of human biological research confirms that human life begins at
conception—fertilization. At fertilization, the human being emerges as a whole,
genetically distinct, individuated zygotic living human organism, a member of the
species Homo sapiens, needing only the proper environment in order to grow and
develop. The difference between the individual in its adult stage and in its zygotic
stage is one of form, not nature.
230
UDHR, supra note 37, art. 3 (emphasis added).
231
Choudhury, supra note 34, at 283.
232
UDHR, supra note 37, art. 1; Finegan, supra note 79, at 93.
233
See, e.g., Zampas & Gher, supra note 7.
234
Finegan, supra note 79, at 93-94. The inclusion of the term “born”
“echoes Rousseau’s Social Contract and Article 1 of the 1789 French Declaration
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which Rousseau helped inspire (‘Men are
born and remain free and equal in rights’).” Id. at 95. “Rousseau’s moral opposition
to abortion indicates that he had no difficulty employing “born” as a signifier
without implying that the value of “humanity” has no pre-natal application.” Id.
229
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Chilean delegate Hernan Santa Cruz, who also supported its
inclusion, both stated their approval of including the unborn as
holders of human rights during the drafting of the Declaration.235
Likewise, Charles Malik, the Lebanese delegate, requested that the
summary record reflect that the Chinese, Soviet, and English
delegates’ desire to omit the phrase “from the moment of
conception” from the UDHR’s recognition of the right to life was
from an interest in textual concision.236 Moreover, the three delegates
considered inclusion of the unborn “to be implied in the general
terms of [Article 3].”237 While there was a discussion of explicitly
extending the right to life to the unborn, the proposal was rejected
out of consideration for the fact that some nations allowed abortion
under certain circumstances, as well as from a desire tomaintain
brevity in the language of the UDHR.238 Accordingly, considering the
UDHR’s preamble, text, and travaux, the Declaration could be
interpreted to permit, but not necessarily require, inclusion of the
unborn in the right to life. To interpret the Declaration or its
derivative human rights instruments to include a right to abortion,
however, requires an interpretive stretch that involves several
intratextual contradictions.239
b. Under the ICCPR
In broad language that echoes the UDHR, Article 6(1) of the
ICCPR states, “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life.”240 As the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) has stated, the right to life enunciated in Article 6
Finegan, supra note 79, at 95-96.
Id. at 96-97.
237
Id. At this point in the drafting history, present-day Article 3 was draft
Article 4. Id. at 96.
238
Id. at 96. Finegan notes that “no delegate argued in favor of retaining
the term ‘born’ on the basis that it meant that only actual physically born human
beings could claim human rights.” Id. at 94.
239
See, e.g., infra Section IV.A.1.b. (discussing the prohibition against
applying the death penalty to a pregnant convict in the context of the ICCPR) and
notes 266-70 (regarding sex-selective abortion and gender discrimination, which is
prohibited by Article 7 of the UDHR).
240
ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 6(1) (emphasis added).
235
236
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of the ICCPR “is the supreme right from which no derogation is
permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life
of the nation (art. 4).”241 The inclusion of unborn human beings in
Article 6(1)’s protections logically flows from Article 6(5)’s
prohibition against imposing the death penalty upon pregnant
women.
Article 6(5) of the ICCPR states, “[The] [s]entence of death
shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
women.”242 A harmonious interpretation of Article 6(1)’s broadly
stated right to life and Article 6(5)’s prohibition recognizes the status
of the unborn child as a human being separate from his or her
mother. Any other interpretation would render the prohibition
meaningless. Accordingly, “it is more plausible to judge that Article
6(1) protects the right to life of the unborn to some indeterminate
extent than to judge that it does not protect the right to life of the
unborn to any extent.”243 A legal scholar who studied the entire
ICCPR legislative history found that the drafters specifically included
Article 6(5)’s prohibition “out of consideration for ‘the interests of
the unborn child.’“244 Several other scholars have reached the same
conclusion based on their reading of the travaux.245 One draft of the
ICCPR specifically states, “The principal reason for providing . . .
that the death sentence should not be carried out on pregnant

241
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, art.6, ¶ 1 (16th
session, 1982), http://www.refworld.org/
docid/45388400a.html.
242
ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 6(5).
243
Finegan, supra note 79, at 107.
244
Id. at 108. Finnegan states:
What becomes clear from reading the entirety of the debates is the extent to which
supporters of the provision based their support on the full humanity of the unborn
child. Delegates from Peru, Indonesia, India, Canada, Israel, and Japan each
referenced the need to protect either the “child” or “children” or “persons” from
the death penalty, while referring specifically to the unborn. The provision was
adopted by fifty-three votes to five, with fourteen abstentions. No delegate voiced
opposition to the paragraph on the grounds that it protected the unborn child.
Id.
245
Id.
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women was to save the life of an innocent unborn child.”246
Furthermore, Article 6(5) does not specify a point in the prenatal
human being’s development at which the prohibition becomes
operative: it applies from the moment of conception. Article 6(1)’s
right to life should include the unborn so as to not render Article
6(5)’s prohibition meaningless.
The Human Rights Committee fails to reconcile the
contradiction between excluding unborn human beings from Article
6(1)’s right to life and Article 6(5)’s prohibition against applying the
death penalty to pregnant women. In Draft Comment 36, the
Committee states, “The special protection afforded to pregnant
women stems from an interest in protecting the rights and interests
of affected family members, including the the [sic] unborn fetus and the
fetus’s father.”247 The HRC then contradicts itself, stating, “the
Committee cannot assume that Article 6 imposes on State parties an
obligation to recognize the right to life of unborn children.”248 How
is it that the competing rights of an unborn human being, as well as
the rights of his or her father, conflict with the killing of the unborn
child (at no specified stage of the child’s development) in the context
of the execution of a criminally convicted mother, but not in the
context of a mother’s right to abort her child in any other
situation?249 This logical impasse stems from the fact that “abortion,
insofar as it is successful, always involves ‘the deliberate killing of an
innocent human being.’“250
c.

Under the CRC

While the travaux and a harmonious reading of the provisions
of the ICCPR support an interpretation of the Covenant that
includes prenatal human beings in the right to life, the Convention on
246
G.A. Rep. of the Third Comm., 12th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/3764 (Dec. 6,
1957), http://dag.un.org/handle/11176 /289512?show=full.
247
Draft General Comment No. 36, supra note 66, ¶ 50 (emphasis added).
248
Id. ¶ 7.
249
See supra Section II.A.1 (discussing abortion and the mother’s right to
life).
250
John M. Breen, Love, Truth, and the Economy: A Reflection on Benedict XVI’s
Caritas in Veritate, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 987, 1006 (2010).
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the Rights of the Child explicitly recognizes the unborn as holders of
human rights. Through Article 6(1) of the CRC, “States Parties
recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.”251 Article 1
defines a “child” for purposes of the Convention as “every human being
below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the
child, majority is attained earlier.”252 As others have noted, Article 1’s
definition provides a ceiling, but not a floor, in terms of the age of
the child who is to be included in the Convention’s protections.253
Furthermore, the preamble states that “the child, by reason of his
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care,
including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.”254
Although the CRC’s text, especially in light of the preamble, provides
strong support for the inclusion of the unborn as children entitled to
protection of the right to life, the travaux of the CRC indicate that
the drafters did not intend to forbid abortion in every situation, as
the domestic laws of some of the negotiating states allowed abortion
under certain circumstances.255 Nonetheless, in the VCLT’s hierarchy
CRC, supra note 45, art. 6(1) (emphasis added).
Id. art. 1.
253
See, e.g., Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 31, at 186.
254
CRC, supra note 45, pmbl. ¶ 9 (emphasis added). While the preamble
itself is not legally binding on states parties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties instructs that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose” and that the preamble is one of three
parts of the treaty, along with the text and annexes, that comprise the treaty’s
“context.” VCLT, supra note 82, art 31(1)-(2). See Janoff, supra note 82, at 168-69
(noting that the preambular reference to the unborn child informs the definition of
“child” for purposes of the Convention’s protections). See also Finegan, supra note
79, at 117 (“The preamble to a treaty, as Alston acknowledges, enunciates the
broad general principles relevant to the treaty. The ninth preambular paragraph [of
the CRC] thus enunciates the principle that what proceeds it concerns all children,
born and unborn. No article of the UNCRC comes close to contradicting this
principle.”). But see Stewart, supra note 31, at 167 (“The Convention cannot fairly be
read to require legislative action to protect the fetus because the text of Article 6 is
silent on this subject, despite the reference in the ninth preambular
paragraph. . . .”). Stewart supports this position by referencing the travaux, which
indicate that “a credible effort was made during the drafting process to ensure that
the Convention is ‘abortion neutral.’“ Id. at 178.
255
See Stewart, supra note 31, at 178 (“A credible effort was made during
the drafting process to ensure that the Convention is ‘abortion neutral.’“); see also
Finegan, supra note 79, at 120-21. Finegan concedes that
251
252
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of interpretive aids, the “preamble ranks higher than the travaux as a
hermeneutic key.”256
In addition to the preamble and the travaux, the VCLT
provides that reference may be made to the states parties’ subsequent
practice when interpreting a treaty.257 Given the range of CRC states
parties’ positions on abortion and the status of the unborn,
subsequent practice is not dispositive on whether the term “child”
includes the unborn.258 The varied subsequent practice may indicate,
however, that the states parties intended to allow each state to
balance the unborn person’s right to life with the adolescent mother’s
rights. Overall, given the preamble’s clear inclusion of the unborn as
being entitled to legal protection, as well as the VCLT’s hierarchy of
interpretive methods, there is more support for the CRC’s protection
of the unborn than not.
2. Other Rights in U.N. Human Rights Treaties
While certain rights obviously do not apply to a prenatal
person, such as the freedom from arbitrary arrest or the freedom to
dispose of wealth, states may consider rights such as the right to
health and the right to be free from torture and from cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment (CIDT) as applicable to unborn human
it remains unwarranted to claim that the UNCRC protects the unborn child’s right
to life to an extent that renders all forms of abortion impermissible. A thorough
analysis of the travaux precludes such a conclusion, since sensitivities over
domestic abortion laws were the reason for omitting an even more explicit
affirmation of the human rights of unborn children. So it is partially correct to
describe the final text of the UNCRC as a compromise of sorts. Yet it was very far
from an entirely neutral compromise, as the unborn child’s status as a bearer of
human rights was explicitly recognized even if the implications of this status vis-avis abortion, in particular, were not positively unpacked with the degree of
specificity and precision associated with statute law.
Id.
256
Finegan, supra note 79, at 118. Article 32 of the VCLT allows recourse
“to the supplementary means of interpretation ‘in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” Id.
257
See VCLT, supra note 82, art. 31(3)(b).
258
See supra Section II.B.
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beings where interpretive methods under the VCLT do not yield a
contrary result.
The right to freedom from torture or CIDT is an especially
relevant right for the unborn human being, considering the early
gestational point at which a baby can feel the extreme pain inherent
to abortion techniques.259 In fact, as of March 2016, twelve states
within the United States of America prohibit abortion after twenty
weeks because of fetal pain.260 Recognizing the medical reality of fetal
pain, Utah requires physicians to administer anesthesia to prenatal
children of twenty gestational weeks or later prior to their abortion.261
On October 3, 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, which would ban most
abortions after the twentieth week of pregnancy.262

See Doctors on Fetal Pain, supra note 137.
Ashley Fantz, Utah Passes ‘Fetal Pain’ Abortion Law Requiring Anesthesia,
CNN (Mar. 29, 2016, 3:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/29/health/utahabortion-law-fetal-pain/index.html.
261
Id. While CNN is quick to denounce the Utah bill’s recognition of fetal
pain, the medical concept is well-documented. For example, in 2011 the Harvard
Mahoney Neuroscience Institute published an article noting that
various studies published in the early 1980s reported finding a high density of a
chemical messenger called substance P in areas of the fetal brain associated with
pain perception and response. Although substance P is one of several
neurotransmitters in the central nervous system, it is the only one shown
to play a role in transmitting pain impulses.
THE HARVARD MAHONEY NEUROSCIENCE INSTITUTE LETTER, THE LONG LIFE
OF EARLY PAIN 2 (2001), https://hms.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/HMS
_OTB_Winter11_Vol17_No1.pdf; see also Johnnye S. Johnson, Fetal Pain: Life in
Troubled Waters, 16 J PERINATAL EDUC. 44, 45 (2007) (“The belief . . . that fetuses
. . . ‘feel no pain’ is not true. It is, in fact, a tragic medical myth, one that
professional groups such as the American Academy of Pediatrics (2000) and the
National Association of Neonatal Nurses have worked in recent years to debunk.”)
(internal citations omitted).
262
Mike DeBonis and Jenna Johnson, With Trump’s Backing, House Approves
Ban on Abortion After 20 Weeks of Pregnancy, WASH. POST. (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/with-trumps-backing-houseapproves-ban-on-abortion-after-20-weeks-of-pregnancy/2017/10/03/95c64786a86c-11e7-b3aa-c0e2e1d41e38_story.html?utm_term=.5ac83b3191d6.
The
Washington Post has predicted that the bill will not pass the Senate. Id.
259
260
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In addition to the physical torture a baby experiences in an
abortion, at least by the twenty-week stage of development, medical
evidence has shown that the unborn human being is capable of
suffering psychological or emotional trauma.263 It is hard to imagine
that the experience of being injected with a feticide that causes a
heart attack or being “torn limb from limb,” as occurs in the “dilation
and evacuation” method of abortion, would not wreak emotional
havoc on a human being that rises to the level of torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment.264 U.N. treaty monitoring bodies
should at least balance these facts against their efforts to infer a right
to abortion through the mother’s right to privacy and other rights of
the mother that should carry less weight than freedom from torture
or CIDT.
3. The Prohibition Against Discrimination
All the principal human rights treaties prohibit denying the
rights guaranteed therein on the basis of discrimination. For example,
See Johnson, supra note 260, at 45 .
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy described the “dilation
and evacuation” method of abortion as follows: The fetus, in many cases, dies just
as a human adult or child would: It bleeds to death as it is torn from limb from
limb. The fetus can be alive at the beginning of the dismemberment process and
can survive for a time while its limbs are being torn off. Dr. Carhart agreed that
“when you pull out a piece of the fetus, let’s say, an arm or a leg and remove that,
at the time just prior to removal of the portion of the fetus, . . . the fetus [is] alive.”
Dr. Carhart has observed fetal heartbeat via ultrasound with “extensive parts of the
fetus removed,” and testified that mere dismemberment of a limb does not always
cause death because he knows of a physician who removed the arm of a fetus only
to have the fetus go on to be born “as a living child with one arm.” At the
conclusion of a D&E abortion no intact fetus remains. In Dr. Carhart’s words, the
abortionist is left with “a tray full of pieces.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 958-959 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined
by Rehnquist, C.J. (internal citations omitted)). See also The Basics, DOCTORS ON
FETAL PAIN, http://www.doctorsonfetalpain.com/fetal-pain-the-evidence/ (last
visited Feb. 23, 2018). The other common method of abortion is by injection of
digoxin into the baby’s heart, causing a fatal heart attack, after which “[t]he dead
baby is then removed from his or her mother by dismemberment.” Id. Only
seventeen of the fifty U.S. states ban abortion after the twentieth week of
pregnancy. See State Policy Updates Major Develops in Sexual and Reproductive Health,
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore
/state-policies-later-abortions (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
263
264
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Article 2(1) of the CRC prohibits discrimination on any basis,
instructing states parties to
respect and ensure the rights set forth in the [CRC] to
each child within their jurisdiction without
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s
or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability,
birth or other status.265
Many children are aborted on the basis of disability that is
detected in utero.266 It could be argued that domestic laws that permit
abortion in the case of disability, but would otherwise disallow
abortion in the particular situation, promote a violation of the unborn
human being’s right to be free from discrimination. As an alternative
to such discrimination, states could address the undeniable challenges
mothers face in raising a child with disabilities by providing support
services that meet the mother’s and child’s needs in each unique
situation.
Abortion can also constitute a violation of the prenatal
human being’s rights on the basis of gender discrimination. In 2006,
the Committee on the Rights of the Child published General
Comment No. 7, Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood,
explicitly identifying sex-selective abortion as a violation of the
unborn girl’s human rights, specifically her right to life. The General
Comment states, “Discrimination against girl children is a serious
violation of rights, affecting their survival and all areas of their young
lives as well as restricting their capacity to contribute positively to

CRC, supra note 45, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
For example, in the United Kingdom, ninety percent of women who
discover their child has Down’s syndrome choose to abort. Alison Gee, A World
Without Down’s Syndrome?, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-37500189; see also Ethics Guide, Disability in
the Foetus, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/abortion/philosophical/disability
.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
265
266
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society.”267 As an example of discrimination that violates a female
child’s rights, the Committee then states, “They may be victims of
selective abortion. . . .”268 Likewise, the outcome document for the Cairo
conference identified sex-selective abortion as discrimination against
female children, which the document described as “harmful and
unethical.”269 Similarly, the outcome document for the 1995 Beijing
conference stated, “Acts of violence against women also include . . .
prenatal sex selection.”270
It is hard to reconcile how aborting a child on the basis of
gender is “harmful and unethical,” a “serious violation of rights,” and
“violence against women,” while U.N. treaty committees and certain
U.N. offices and agencies, such as the WHO and OCHCR, consider
it a mother’s right to abort her child on other grounds. Moreover, in
light of the Cairo and Beijing outcome documents’ general negative
comments about abortion, as well as their condemnation of sexselective abortion, it is ironic that the U.N. treaty committees and
pro-choice NGOs continue to cite the conference documents in
support of an inferred right to abortion.271
B. Customary International Law and Protection for the Unborn
Considering the wide range of state positions on abortion,
there is not sufficiently consistent state practice to establish a global
customary rule of law regarding the unborn human being’s right to
life.272 There may, however, be a regional custom of recognizing the
rights of the unborn. For example, in Latin America and the
Caribbean, “state practice . . . subsequent to the ratification of the
[Convention on the Rights of the Child], demonstrates that states
U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 7:
Implementing Child Rights in Early Education, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, ¶
11.b.i (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/crc/docs/AdvanceVersions/GeneralComment7Rev1.pdf.
268
Id.
269
Cairo Conference, supra note 91, at 34.
270
Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15, 1995,
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, ¶ 115, U.N. Doc. DPI/1766/Wom,
Annex 1 (Feb. 1996) (emphasis added).
271
See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
272
See supra Section II.B.
267
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parties . . . have consistently understood it to ban elective abortion, in
spite of CRC Committee recommendations to the contrary, and to
mandate state protection of unborn life throughout pregnancy, from
conception to birth.”273
V. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE BACKDOOR PUSH
FOR A RIGHT TO ABORTION
As already discussed, the non-legislative attempt to create a
right to abortion produces numerous problems: violations of state
sovereignty; loss of U.N. treaty body legitimacy; practical issues of
state fulfillment of a right to abortion, such as violating the right to
conscientious objection of medical professionals, owners of medical
facilities, and private insurance companies; and, most importantly, a
violation of the competing rights of the unborn child. In addition to
these issues, the backdoor push to create a right to abortion threatens
to devalue other human rights by dilution, stymies human rights
progress in other areas, and could eventually create a schism wherein
human rights are no longer considered universal.274
A. Devaluation of Existing Human Rights
The assertion of an inferred right to abortion threatens to
devalue the human rights that states carefully negotiated and
explicitly agreed to recognize in binding human rights treaties. In
Professor Stephen P. Marks’ words, “[I]t would weaken the idea of
human rights in general if numerous claims or values were
indiscriminately proclaimed as human rights.”275 Accordingly,
professor Marks recommends stringent standards for new rights,
including enforceability and non-infringement of already existing
rights.276
The proclamation by treaty monitoring bodies of a right to
abortion, without a basis in international law and in contravention of
De Jesus, supra note 85, at 606.
JAKOB CORNIDES, NATURAL AND UN-NATURAL LAW 5 (2010),
https://c-fam.org/wp-content/uploads/Un-Natural-Law-FINAL.pdf.
275
HANNUM, supra note 27, at 95-6.
276
Id.
273
274
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states’ domestic legislation, fails to meet Professor Marks’ criteria.
First, as argued in supra Section II.A, the assertion of a right to
abortion could present significant enforcement challenges, such as
requiring states to supply sufficient and accessible abortion
practitioners and facilities despite funding limitations and potentially
in violation of the states’ domestic laws. Second, a proclamation of a
right to abortion could also infringe established rights of freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion, and potentially freedom of
expression or opinion.277 Hopefully as states push back against the
surreptitious effort to assert a right to abortion, the U.N. and prochoice NGOs will consider addressing the issue in a forthright
manner that honors state commitments to human rights treaties and
preserves the value of the rights those instruments explicitly
guarantee.
B. Loss of Human Rights Progress in Other Areas
The backdoor effort to create a right to abortion
compromises progress in other areas of human rights by absorbing
an inordinate amount of U.N. treaty body attention, as seen in the
countless Committee communications that have focused on this
issue.278 In addition, the dogged attempt to create a right to abortion
has shifted discussions at U.N. conferences away from other human
rights issues. This is precisely what occurred at the 1994 U.N.
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, “where an
abortion rights initiative . . . pushed all other population and
See, e.g., text accompanying supra notes 101-03, 105-10 & 125. Professor
Glendon has also cautioned against the haphazard creation of new human rights
such as abortion, stating, “As memories fade about why it was necessary after
World War II to affirm the existence of certain inalienable rights, the citizens of the
world must be vigilant to prevent trivialization and dilution of those basic
protections of human dignity.” Glendon, What Happened at Beijing, supra note 87.
278
See Safe Abortion, supra note 51, at 99, nn.9-10 (citing a long list of
U.N. treaty committee general comments and concluding observations that urge
states to liberalize their domestic abortion laws); see also CRR, Ireland Must Legalize
Abortion, supra note 2, at n.8 (listing numerous treaty monitoring body
communications that “have specified that in order to ensure women’s rights states
should liberalize their abortion laws”); supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text
(stating that the CEDAW Committee alone has criticized the abortion laws of over
one hundred states parties).
277
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development issues into the background.”279 Likewise, at a 2011
General Assembly meeting, numerous nations criticized the HRC
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health for ignoring his mandate
by neglecting critical health issues, such as hunger and disease, and
instead focusing his report on the “non-existent right to abortion.”280
The Special Rapporteur was also criticized for his “systematic
attempts to reinterpret internationally agreed conventions and to
disregard intergovernmental documents in which the right to health
and its derived rights had been clearly defined. . . .”281
Perhaps the most poignant illustration of the waste of
international resources caused by the push for a right to abortion was
the failure, for the first time in history, to adopt an outcome
document at the 2015 U.N. Commission on Population and
Development (UNCPD).282 The UNCPD is an annual meeting at
U.N. Headquarters to discuss progress toward fulfilling the goals of
the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development
in Cairo.283 The reason for the 2015 failure was that countries could
not reach consensus on the right to abortion. On one side, there were
“strong appeals to have sexual and reproductive health and rights
embedded in the outcome document.”284 On the other side, states felt
“harassed” and “discredited” by the U.N. Population Fund with
respect to their national abortion legislation.285

Glendon, What Happened at Beijing, supra note 87.
Several Aspects of Sexual, Reproductive Health, supra note 21. The
meeting summary noted opposition to the Rapporteur’s advocacy of a right to
abortion by Egypt, Chile, Argentina, and Swaziland, and “others.”
281
Id.
282
Press Release, Economic and Social Council, Commission on
Population and Development Unable to Agree upon Proposed Resolution,
Reproductive Rights Among Points of Contention, POP/1041 (Apr. 17, 2015),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/pop1041.doc.htm [hereinafter Points of
Contention].
283
Pro-Life and Family Member States Reject Outcome Document at UN
Commission on Population and Development, ADF INT’l (Apr. 21, 2015),
https://adfinternational.org/detailspages/press-release-details/pro-life-and-familymember-states-reject-outcome-document-at-un-commission-on-population-anddevelopment.
284
Points of Contention, supra note 281.
285
Id.
279
280
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In 2017, the Commission again was unable to reach
consensus on the outcome document, due in large part to
disagreement about a right to abortion.286 Commission Chair Alya
Ahmed Saif al-Thani described this as “a major failure.”287 On the
pro-abortion rights side of the 2017 UNCPD, the Assistant
Secretary-General for Policy Coordination in the Department of
Social and Economic Affairs referenced the “‘unfinished business’ of
the Cairo Agenda,” meaning the effort to “ensure sexual and
reproductive health rights,” including abortion.288 Russia’s
representative summed up the opposing side’s perspective that
“pushing sexual and reproductive health rights as indivisible from
human rights was nothing but an attempt to undermine international
agreements on human rights.”289 He considered that “[s]uch
formulations diluted basic human rights, which only discredited the
Commission’s work [and] express[ed] opposition to use of the
Commission as a ‘back door’ through which to force various human
rights concepts that did not meet the broader consensus.”290
The effort to create a right to abortion also stymies human
rights progress by discouraging states from ratifying human rights
treaties to which they might agree but for the well-founded concern
that U.N. bodies, and even other nations, would try to read a right to
abortion into the treaty commitments. The United States, for
example, has declined to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the
Child in large part because of concerns that ratification will impact
U.S. abortion laws291 as well as raise federalism concerns.292 Likewise,
Press Release, Economic and Social Council, Commission on
Population and Development Fails to Adopt Outcome Document as Fiftieth
Session Concludes, POP/1060 (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.un.org/press/
en/2017/pop1060. doc.htm.
287
Id.
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Soo Jee Lee, A Child’s Voice Vs. a Parent’s Control: Resolving a Tension
Between the Convention on the Rights of the Child and U.S. Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 687,
700 (2017); see also Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 31, at 178.
292
Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 31, at 177 (citing Susan Kilbourne,
Student Research, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Federalism Issues for the
United States, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 327, 327 (1998)).
286
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abortion concerns have at least partly influenced the United States’
decision to not ratify the CEDAW and the ICESCR.293
C. Danger of Withdrawal or Schism
Given the strong resentment some states have toward efforts
by U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, agencies, and special rapporteurs
to interpret human rights treaties to include a right to abortion, some
states may choose to withdraw from the treaties altogether.294
International law scholars have taken notice of this possibility. As
Duke Professor Laurence Helfer has stated, “overlegalizing human
rights can lead even liberal democracies to reconsider their
commitment to international institutions that protect those rights.”295
Likewise, UCLA Law professor Randall Peerenboom has noticed
that “fault lines have become readily apparent as the human rights
movement has gained in power and attempted to enforce increasingly
specific interpretations of rights.”296 Professor Pereenboom has
further observed that “[t]he growing power of the international
human rights movement has led to a backlash as countries have
begun to feel the movement’s bite.”297 Should the resistant states’
resentment continue to grow, what is now a division with the
potential to cause treaty withdrawals may, in the words of a
European Commission official, reach the point of “schism in the
world of legal thought [whereby] human rights would no longer be

Id. at 168. General concerns about treaty body overreach have also
discouraged the U.S. from ratifying the CRPD. See also Candace Farmer, Can the
U.S. Use a Reservation to Alleviate Sovereignty Concerns Regarding the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities? 43 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 249, 257 (2014) (“The
true root of [U.S.] apprehension [in ratifying the CRPD] is traced back to the
uncertainty of the Expert Committee’s power restraints. . . .”).
294
Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 78.
295
Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1836 (2002).
296
Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the
Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 809, 824 (2005).
297
Id.
293

134

2018

Pushing a Right to Abortion through the Backdoor

6:1

universal.”298 The need for a better approach to abortion and the
rights of the unborn could not be more evident.299
VI. THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION: USING AN AMENDMENT OR
OPTIONAL PROTOCOLS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE UNBORN IN U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
The backdoor attempt to create a right to abortion through
inference has produced division and resentment in the international
community, absorbed resources at the expense of other attentionworthy issues, and caused a host of other problems.300 Although the
strategy has successfully pressured some states into changing their
abortion laws,301 other states continue to resist, and the acrimony
seems to be mounting, as seen in the 2015 and 2017 UNCPD failures
to reach consensus.302 Given that pro-choice NGOs and treaty
monitoring bodies do not appear to be backing down, perhaps the
international community is ready to reaffirm the traditional and
universally accepted way of creating international law: through
contracts made by willing sovereign nations.303

Cornides, supra note 273, at 5.
Philip Alston’s 1984 article that accurately predicted the coordination of
NGOs and treaty monitoring bodies to assert new human rights also provided
advice: “a more orderly and considered procedure should be followed before the
United Nations accords the highly prized status of a human right to any additional
claims.” Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights, supra note 186, at 614.
300
See supra Part V.
301
See generally Zorzi, supra note 15 (discussing the liberalization of abortion
laws in Nepal, Belgium, Ethiopia, Chad, Columbia, Argentina, Peru, and potentially
Chile).
302
See supra Section V.B.
303
Some states, anticipating efforts to interpret human rights treaty
commitments to include a right to abortion, filed reservations, understandings, and
declarations (RUDs) that clarified their national position on abortion and the rights
of unborn human beings. See, e.g., Finegan, supra note 79, at n.142 (describing
declarations to the CRC by Argentina, Guatemala, and Ecuador that extend the
Convention’s protections to unborn human beings, as well as reservations by
China, France, Tunisia, and the U.K., that preempt restrictions on national abortion
laws). Because states may only file RUDs at the time of ratification or accession,
states that did not see the backdoor effort coming missed their opportunity to
298
299
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If states parties to the relevant U.N. human rights treaties
could definitively settle the matter of abortion and the rights of the
unborn, then the international community could move forward and
turn their attention to issues that have been neglected for the
preoccupation with abortion. States would likely reach consensus at
the UNCPD once again, and the vast flow of resources that the U.N.,
states, and NGOs have spent to push for an international right to
abortion could be redirected to issues such as disease, hunger, and
education. In addition, nations, such as the United States, would
likely be more open to ratifying U.N. human rights treaties once the
debate and uncertainty regarding abortion and the rights of the
unborn are finally put to rest. With the adoption of treaty committee
ethics guidelines and mandate clarification, the U.N. treaty
compliance system could regain integrity and therefore become more
effective in fulfilling its original purpose of helping nations meet their
treaty obligations.304
There are two options for legislatively settling the issue of
abortion and rights of the unborn under the existing human rights
treaties: amendment and the adoption of optional protocols. Wellresourced nations with the strongest positions on abortion and rights
of the unborn are perhaps the most likely candidates for leading
efforts to alter treaty agreements through amendments or additional
protocols, as they are less vulnerable to international pressure.
A. Amendment to Existing Human Rights Treaties
Through an amendment, U.N. human rights treaties could
explicitly clarify that abortion and the rights of the unborn are left to
each individual state or establish some basic parameters for these
issues. The relevant U.N. treaties for abortion and rights of the
clarify their position on abortion and rights of the unborn within the treaty system.
VCLT, supra note 82, art. 23(2). However, even states that did successfully file
RUDs have received significant pressure from treaty monitoring bodies who,
unhappy with the states’ abortion-limiting statements, have declared such RUDs to
violate the “object and purpose” of the treaty and therefore, under the VCLT, to be
invalid and of no effect. Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at n.16.
304
See Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 80-82 (proposing treaty body
reform).
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unborn are the ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC, CAT, CRPD, and CEDAW.
The first five of these six instruments describe the amendment
procedure with some detail. The CEDAW does not refer to
“amendments” per se, but does give a very brief description of the
process for “revisions,” stating that any state party may, at any time,
submit to the U.N. Secretary General a written request for revision to
the CEDAW.305 Upon receipt of a revision request, the CEDAW
simply states that the U.N. General Assembly “shall decide upon the
steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request.”306
The more detailed amendment procedure for the other five
relevant treaties is essentially the same for each instrument.307 Any
state party to the treaty may file an amendment request with the U.N.
Secretary General.308 The Secretary General then communicates the
proposed amendment to each state party and requests notification of
whether the state party agrees to a conference for the purpose of
discussing and voting on the proposed amendment.309 If one-third of
the states parties agree to the conference, the Secretary General will
convene the meeting under the auspices of the United Nations.310
Should a majority of the states that are present vote in favor of the
amendment, it will go to the General Assembly for a vote.311 The
amendment enters into force upon approval by the General
Assembly and acceptance by two-thirds of the states parties to the

CEDAW, supra note 96, art. 26(1).
Id. art. 26.2. In practice, the revision process for the CEDAW has been
similar to that of the other human rights treaties. Michael Bowman, Towards a
Unified Treaty Body for Monitoring Compliance with UN Human Rights Conventions? Legal
Mechanisms for Treaty Reform, 7 HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 225, n.53 (2007).
307
See ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 51; ICESCR, supra note 41, art. 29; CRC,
supra note 45, art. 50; CAT, supra note 129, art. 29; G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 47 (Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter
CRPD].
308
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 51(1).
309
See id.
310
Id.
311
Id.
305
306
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treaty.312 The amendment binds only the states parties that have
accepted it.313
One of the risks of seeking an amendment that leaves matters
of abortion and rights of the unborn completely in the discretion of
each state party is that states could use the amendment to justify
extreme behavior at either end of the abortion debate. For example,
some states may choose not to balance the mother’s right to life
against that of her unborn child where life-saving treatment for the
mother involves the foreseen but undesired loss of her child.314 On
the other end of the spectrum, without some restrictions, states could
allow for particularly brutal scenarios such as late-term abortion315 or
practices that shock the conscience, such as conception solely for the
purpose of aborting and selling the child for fetal tissue research, as
was proposed in the Harvard Journal of Law and Gender.316
To guard against these undesirable extremes, an amendment
to the relevant human rights treaties could set forth basic limitations

See, e.g., id. art. 51(2).
See, e.g., id. art. 51(3). The CRPD provides for a slightly different rule
with respect to the binding nature of amendments made to Articles 34, 38, 39 and
40. The CRPD Conference of States Parties can agree by consensus to have
amendments to these four articles apply to all States parties, provided the
amendments otherwise satisfy the procedural requirements. CRPD, supra note 306,
art. 47(3).
314
See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
315
Seven nations, including the United States, currently permit elective
abortion after twenty weeks. Robert King, Graham: U.S. Must Exit ‘Club’ of Countries
Allowing Late-Term Abortion, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 15, 2016, 11:31 AM),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/graham-us-must-exit-club-of-countriesallowing-late-term-abortion/article/2585839.
316
See V. Noah Gimbel, Fetal Tissue Research & Abortion: Conscription,
Commodification, and the Future of Choice, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 229, 239 (2017).
The author states:
In a fetal tissue free market, conceiving to abort for the purpose of “donation”
would be recognized as a valuable form of women’s biolabor. Like prostitution to
the feminist decriminalization camp, women’s ability to profit off of their sexual
and reproductive capacities would carry the liberatory promise of enhanced
economic independence and even better reproductive healthcare. If the fetus . . . is
just an extension of the woman’s body, selling it is no different than selling sex.
Id. at 277.
312
313
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with respect to abortion and rights of the unborn. Given that only a
few countries prohibit abortion where the procedure is determined to
be necessary to save the mother’s life, it is likely that the General
Assembly and two-thirds of the states parties to the ICCPR,
ICESCR, CRC, CAT, CRPD, and CEDAW317 would agree to an
amendment that permitted the more restrictive parameter of lifesaving treatment for the mother that involved the foreseeable but
unintentional death of the unborn child.318 Likewise, at the other end
of the spectrum, as of 2014 only four states allow abortion on
demand after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy.319 Accordingly, it
is likely that the General Assembly and two-thirds of the states
parties to the relevant U.N. human rights treaties would agree to
prohibit abortion on demand after the twenty-fourth week of
pregnancy.
B. Adoption of Optional Protocols
As an alternative to treaty amendments, states parties to the
ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC, CAT, CRPD, and CEDAW could explicitly
set forth their position on abortion and rights of the unborn in two
optional protocols. An optional protocol is a treaty by its own right,
and only the states parties to the original treaty who also ratify or
accede to the protocol are bound by it.320 One protocol could
explicitly set forth a woman’s right to abortion and relevant
limitations, and a second protocol could set forth the rights of the
317
Unlike the ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC, CAT, and CRPD, the amendment
process for the CEDAW is unclear. See supra notes 304-05 and accompanying text.
318
See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, THE WORLD’S ABORTION
LAWS 2014 (2014), https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.
net/files/documents/AbortionMap2014.PDF (indicating that, as of 2014, only the
abortion prohibition laws of Chile, El Salvador, Malta, and Nicaragua, did not have
an exception where necessary to save the mother’s life).
319
Id. According to the Center for Reproductive Rights, as of 2014, only
Canada, North Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam allow for abortion “for any reason”
past the 24th week of pregnancy. Id. China also allows for abortion after the 24th
week of pregnancy for any reason but sex selection. Id.
320
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, What Is an Optional Protocol?, U.N. ENTITY FOR GENDER EQUALITY AND
THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw
/protocol/whatis.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
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unborn as they relate to specific provisions of the treaty. While it
would be contradictory to have opposing protocols to the same
treaty, the preambular language of the protocols would include the
rationale for the protocols.
Thus far, optional protocols have been a more common
procedure than amendments for modifying U.N. human rights
treaties, and only protocols have been used to make substantive
changes to treaty commitments.321 Three protocols have given states
parties the option to modify substantive provisions of human rights
treaties: the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death
Penalty;322 the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict;323 and
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.324
As with amendments, the use of optional protocols to clarify
rights pertaining to abortion and unborn human beings risks creating
undesirable interpretations at both ends of the abortion debate.
However extreme interpretations could be preempted through
carefully chosen textual language. Optional protocols on abortion
and rights of the unborn also risk contributing to human rights
321
See
Amendments
to
the
Treaties,
BAYEFSKY,
http://www.bayefsky.com/tree.php/area/amend (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) (listing
three U.N. human rights treaty amendments); The Core International Human Rights
Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2018)
(listing nine protocols, three of which substantively change treaty commitments).
There have been two treaty amendments and a third that is not yet in effect; all
three pertain to treaty committee matters (emoluments, number of treaty
committee members, and committee meeting time).
322
G.A. Res. 44/128, Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, (Dec. 15, 1989).
323
G.A. Res. 54/263, annex, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, (May 25,
2000).
324
G.A. Res. 54/263, annex, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child
Pornography, (May 25, 2000).
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dilution, as argued in Section V.A; however, this risk is higher in a
protocol creating a new right to abortion than in a protocol that
extends already-existing rights to the unborn. In any case, these risks
are arguably outbalanced by the manifold benefits of finally closing
the backdoor effort to create a right to abortion. As an additional
consideration, both protocols should provide a withdrawal clause to
give states liberty to alter their international commitments if states
change their domestic policy on these controversial issues.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Given the great divide among states regarding abortion and
the rights of the unborn, as well as the numerous harms that the
backdoor effort to assert a right to abortion has caused, international
law’s best option is to legally clarify these issues. This could be done
through an amendment recognizing, with limits, that abortion and
the rights of the unborn are decidedly left to each sovereign state, or
more likely, through optional protocols to the relevant human rights
treaties. This would promote state sovereignty and U.N. treaty
monitoring body integrity, preserve the value of explicitly providedfor human rights, and lessen the likelihood of treaty withdrawal or a
schism in which human rights are no longer considered universal. In
addition, clarification on abortion and rights of the unborn would
allow the international community to turn its attention and resources
to global issues that have been overshadowed by the abortion debate.
Hopefully a collective desire to move forward on these challenging
issues will prevail at the 2018 UNCPD.
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